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ABSTRACT
A Nation Divided: Assessing the Regional Effects of Institutions, Social Capital, and
Civic Culture on Tax Morale in Italy
by
D’Attoma, John
Ph.D. in Political Science,
University of Missouri-St. Louis, August, 2015.
Professor Kenneth Thomas Ph.D., Chairperson
Cross-national social surveys measure tax morale across a wide variety of political cul-
tures, but little research is available investigating the regional effects of institutions, social
capital, and civic culture on tax morale in Italy. Since tax evasion, by definition, is diffi-
cult to estimate, researchers use the size of the underground economy as a core indicator.
Only Greece (27.5% of GDP) surpasses Italy (17% of GDP) in the size of its underground
economy among Western EU states. Italy’s unique history and regional complexity pro-
vide researchers with a multitude of case study options in a single country. Using the 2004
Bank of Italy Survey of Household Wealth and Income, I undertake a comparative study
assessing the regional effects of social capital and political culture on tax morale in Italy.
I demonstrate that Southern Italy is significantly different than Northern Italy with regards
to tax morale, and that social capital and civic culture positively affect tax morale.
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To compliment the Bank of Italy survey, I use controlled laboratory tax compliance
experiments and a Social Value Orientation task to test if Southern Italians are consistently
different than Northern Italians with regards to their tax compliance even when presented
with the exact same taxpayer environment. I uncover that when put in the same taxpayer
environment, Southerners comply and are just as others-regarding as their Northern coun-
terparts, which supports the framework that institutional context matters.
Finally, by retracing the historical legacy of Italian political and cultural institutions dat-
ing back to the Risorgimento (1815-1871) to the beginning of the Second Republic (1994),
I closely examine the effects of periodic shifts in institutions on behavior, specifically tax
behavior. This allows me to more convincingly establish the contextual setting in which
two divergent civic cultures and taxpayer behaviors were formed. In the end, I conclude
that both institutions and individual agency (culture) act in tandem to shape taxpayer be-
havior. They are not contradictory, but rather they interact to determine why some people
choose to comply and others do not.
iii
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1. Introduction
Ex-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi once famously claimed that the “evasion of high
taxes was a God-given right” in Italy (Bhatti et al. 2012). Recent scholarship on inter-
national political economy has brought new life to the tax evasion debate, precipitated
by sovereign debt crises throughout Europe. Reports from Istat, Corte dei Conti, and
l’Agenzia delle Entrate estimate that tax evasion in Italy costs the state 120 billion eu-
ros per year in lost revenue (Santoro 2010). Prevailing academic discourse revolves around
two perspectives: The theoretical models utilize game theory and an economics of crime
approach (Allingham and Sandmo 1972); the empirical models draw on simulations mim-
icking taxpayer/revenue-collector scenarios. Both models rely heavily on the probability of
detection and the severity of the punishment. More recently, social scientists have examined
different sociopolitical and cultural variables and their impact on evasion and compliance.
Their research centers on why taxpayers voluntarily pay, rather than evade the state. Tax
morale refers to citizens’ intrinsic motivation to pay taxes.
Cross-national social surveys account for tax morale across a wide variety of political
cultures, but little research is available regarding tax morale in Italy. Since tax evasion, by
definition, is difficult to estimate, researchers use the size of the underground economy as
a core indicator. Only Greece (27.5% of GDP) surpasses Italy (17% of GDP) in the size of
its underground economy among Western European Union (EU) states. Italy’s particular
1
history and regional complexity provide researchers with a multitude of case study options
in a single country. This analysis provides a comparative study assessing the regional
effects of institutional capacity, social capital (i.e., trust in others, trust in state institutions)
and civic culture (social capital, levels of communal interaction) on tax morale in Italy. In
addition, it will examine whether institutional capacity postulates a better explanation for
tax behavior than the more individual focused classical and neo-classical models proposed
by Sandmo and Allingham and the amoral familial argument suggested by Edward Banfield
(1958), later expanded upon by Robert Putnam. I make five main hypotheses (see Table
1.1)
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Table 1.1: Statement of Hypotheses
H1 As social capital increases, operationalized as number of associations in
the Bank of Italy Survey and various forms of trust in the World Values
Survey, tax morale will also increase.
H2 As civic culture increases, operationalized as interest in politics and
honesty, so will tax morale.
H3 Living in Northern Italy will have a positive effect on tax morale,
whereas living in the South will have a negative effect on tax morale.
H4 Because Italian taxation is structured to favor the Self-employed, these
individuals will have lower tax morale than employees.
H5 In regions where the government has historically invested in shaping
civic consciousness, respondents will be more willing to contribute, and
hence, have higher tax morale.
According to a 2012 Business Recorder Article by Hanns Jochen Kaffsach (2012),
“Evasione is almost like a sport in Italy, especially for higher-income individuals who de-
clare themselves as poor to the tax authorities.” Using data from ISTAT, Alessandro Santoro
demonstrates that in the northern regions, spanning from Lombardy to Lazio, evasion of
IRAP (regional tax on production) ranges from 13% in Lombardy to 50% in Liguria; in the
southern Mezzogiorno, covering Molise to Sicily, IRAP evasion ranges from 54% in Molise
to 94% in Calabria (Santoro 2010). Data collected by Elisabetta Marzano and colleagues
exhibiting the amount of irregular work as a percent of regular work, which can be used as
an indicator for tax evasion, indicates that the percent of irregular work in the Northern and
Central regions of Italy averaged 9.8% in 2009, but 18.8% in the Mezzogiorno (Chiarini
and Marzano 2007).
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The groundbreaking study, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy,
by Robert Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1994), analyzes factors contributing to institu-
tional performance throughout Italy’s regional landscape. Putnam and his colleagues argue
that due to historical circumstances, the South evinces less civic virtue (a high sense of
trust, honesty, and law-abidingness) than the North, but they do not test whether higher
civic virtue in the latter positively affects tax morale, compared to levels found in the for-
mer. When one superimposes Santoro’s chart of “regional evasion differences” onto Put-
nam’s “civic community and institutional performance” map, the result is a profile of Italy
in which regional levels of institutional performance and civic community closely match
regional levels of tax evasion.
This study updates, synthesizes and expands upon these disparate analyses measur-
ing civic community, institutional capacity/performance, tax morale and actual tax evasion
practices in Italy. This research addresses the question: How do non-economic variables,
specifically those that represent civic culture and social capital affect citizens’ “tax morale”
The social capital (features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and reciprocity, that
can improve efficiency of society) and civic culture literature is bursting with examples of
increased economic development as levels of social capital and civic participation increase
(Almond and Verba 1963; Bigoni et al. 2013; De Blasio and Nuzzo 2006; Fukuyama 1995a;
Herreros 2009; Lyon 2005; Woolcock 1998). Social capital reduces transaction costs and
increases trust, creating reciprocity between stakeholders, which, in turn can increase de-
velopment. I argue that the same can be predicted for tax morale. Social capital and
political culture are concepts that have taken on many definitions; both have been opera-
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tionalized using a variety of unique variables throughout the literature. I am concerned with
social capital as a variable that represents trust, leading to the formation of associations and
networks amongst citizens.
Individual agency is not solely responsible for tax morale, however. As Putnam rightly
points out, institutions and culture form a nexus from which certain behaviors can form.
Although the tax morale literature is laden with cross-national studies, few studies have
examined how institutions and culture interact to affect tax morale; possibly this is due to
the availability of empirical data on social capital and tax morale. These studies address
tax morale by making certain assumptions or generalizations about individuals and the
cultures in which they live, such as lack of civic virtue. Amoral familial refers to cultures
which lack civicmindedness, and instead, show high levels of familial attachment. It is path
dependent, and in that, preserves long-standing cultural stereotypes. Therefore, I will also
examine certain public and private institutions and their effect on taxpayer behavior.
Statistically, my results suggest that there are significant differences between tax morale
in the North and South using a “difference-in-means” t-test. Tax morale is a defined as cit-
izens’ intrinsic motivation to pay taxes and is measured using an index of several questions
from the Bank of Italy survey of household wealth and income. The variable is defined
more thoroughly below in the methodology section. This test estimates the “true" popula-
tion means of each group from the sample collected by the Bank of Italy with confidence
intervals. The p-value < 0.05 shows that the difference between the two is statistically
significant and that the northern mean is definitely higher than that for the South.
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The amount of evasion alone is significant enough to trigger a study analyzing what
behaviors evoke higher levels of tax morale and if those level of tax morale actually affect
evasion. While Italy collects approximately 350 billion euros per year in tax revenue, they
lose an estimated 250 billion euros due to tax evasion and underground economy (Cita-
tion). Other estimates place evasion rates at 25%-30% of GDP. In the late 1970s and 1980s
tax evasion began to climb. In this period, 15-20% of all income was undeclared (Santoro
2010). In the early 1990s, rates started to tic down, but from 2000-2004 those rates began
to expand again (Santoro 2010). Estimates suggest that Italy fails to collect around 26% of
the income tax its citizens owe due to evasion. Considerable disparities register among dif-
ferent types of workers; self-employed individuals and entrepreneurs evade approximately
60% of their income taxes, while employees only evade approximately 10%. Evasion rates
vary in different sectors of the economy as well; estimates suggest the agricultural sector
evades 70.57% of regional production tax while the commercial sector evades 54.78% and
the business services sector evades 46.41%. Family services such as housekeepers and
maids evade approximately 42%. Construction (23.82%) and industrial sectors (9.24%)
evade the least (Santoro 2010). At the regional level, IRAP evasion (regional production
tax) moves from 13%-50% in northern Italy, while in the south the lowest rate is 54%,
while Calabria loses the most at 94% of taxable income. Considering the sheer size of
evasion, it is essential that social scientists not only consider economic determinants of tax
evasion, but also incorporate holistic approaches which incorporate variables that account
for deterrence and detection (game theoretic economic models), as well as variables that
represent citizens’ social characteristics.
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On the one hand, increased levels of tax morale should lead to higher rates of compli-
ance, which could have significant practical implications. Social capital is subject to in-
creasing returns, thus establishing a long trajectory of civic culture and virtue theoretically
will have lasting effects on tax morale and hence, compliance. Putnam’s central premise
and conclusion is conditioned on this path dependent relationship between historical insti-
tutions, social capital, and development. Conducting research that leads to an improved
understanding of how social capital and civic culture induce more robust tax morale will
allow social scientists to pinpoint behaviors that foster social capital, and thus, tax morale.
On the other hand, by studying tax evasion and morale at the institutional level, we can
better understand what constitutes institutions that foster behaviors that lead to evasion.
The study is laid out as follows: In chapter two, I discuss my theoretical framework,
historical institutionalism, civic culture, and social capital, followed by a discussion of the
current debate on tax evasion/compliance, and tax morale. Chapter three is dedicated to
assessing the effects of civic culture and social capital on tax morale quantitatively through
use of survey data provided by the Bank of Italy and experimental data provided by the
“Willing to Pay” project at the European University Institute 1. I confirm that social capital
and civic culture do indeed positively affect tax morale, and the North has significantly
higher tax morale than the South. I also consider other control variables such as religion,
sex, and age that are commonly examined in the literature. By employing laboratory ex-
periments I am able to control the institutional environment while isolating similar type of
1The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the
European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant Agreement n. [295675].
An online appendix with replication data are available at [www.willingtopay.edu].
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individual and cultural traits. My results suggest that culture is important; however, culture
is construed within a particular institutional environment. In chapter four, I present my case
for historical institutionalism, analyzing how the Catholic church and political parties have
helped to shape distinct taxpayer behaviors.
Finally, chapter five is the culmination of the study. I integrate the two theories to
determine a holistic approach to tax morale and evasion. I consider what possible policy
prescriptions can be taken to foster better taxpayer behavior and ensure that the appropriate
taxes are being collected.
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Historical Institutionalism
The past is never dead. It’s not even past (Faulkner 1951,73).
I utilize an historical institutionalist (HI) framework to argue that unique institutional
complexities have led to higher levels of social capital and a different civic culture in the
North than in the South, generating positive tax morale and greater compliance in the North.
Institutions and culture (social capital/civic culture) are often used as opposing variables,
rather than complimentary. Both culture (i.e. Putnam and Fukuyama) and institutions (Pier-
son, Steinmo, and Skocpol) are regularly employed to explain why societies are the way the
are, but rarely are they used together to explain social phenomena. Institutionalism needs
culture, just as culture demands institutionalist explanations. Oftentimes, institutionalism
ignores individual agency in shaping institutional outcomes, whereas culturalists neglect
the institutional setting in which culture is constructed. Instead of developing a purely
institutionalist or culturalist analyst, I treat the two theories as a nexus from which an indi-
vidual tax behavior is formed. It is thus not only that one’s level of civicmindedness affects
their behaviors, but it is rather a combination of culture and institutions. This is not a tale
of what comes first, the chicken or the egg; instead, I argue that institutions and culture
interact to develop tax morale. Exploiting survey data, experimental laboratory data, and
9
historical analysis, I bridge the gap between culture and institutions to produce a deeper
and more thorough understanding of taxpayer behavior.
Although not explicit in their terminology, Putnam and his team use a similar frame-
work to explain diverging levels of social capital and civic virtue between the North and
South of Italy. Instead of emphasizing specific actors shaping political outcomes, institu-
tionalists stress the role of systematic factors in structuring behavior (Steinmo 2008, 159).
Institutions are the rules that shape and constrain behavior; they are both formal and infor-
mal (i.e. The Revenue Agency and clientelism) (Steinmo and Longstreth 1992). HI exam-
ines the historical record to determine why certain outcomes occurred and in what context.
Three important features characterize HI, according to (Pierson and Skocpol 2002,3),
1. Historical institutionalism addresses big, substantive questions that are
inherently of interest to broad publics as well as fellow scholars.
2. Historical institutionalism takes time seriously, specifying sequences and
tracing transformations and processes of veering scale and temporality.
3. Historical institutionalism analyzes macro contexts and hypothesize about
the combined effects of institutions and processes, rather than examining
just one institution or process at at time.
Historical institutionalists strive to answer big questions. In Taxation and Democracy:
Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State, Steinmo ex-
plores three industrialized democracies —the United States (US), Great Britain, and Swe-
den — and their diverse tax regimes and welfare states. Others have investigated how the
US has established many of its institutional features or why countries have developed sta-
ble democracies over time (Katzenstein 1978; Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Steinmo 1996;
Steinmo and Tolbert 1998; Thelen 1997). Historical institutionalists often embark on com-
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parative studies, analyzing a small number of cases and focusing on rich descriptive data
that emphasizes the role institutions play in structuring behavior.
Structures, norms, and ideas develop differently between like actors depending on the
historical and political context in which they are situated. Italy is an ideal case to demon-
strate how divergent political paths can be followed under a unitary political system. Be-
cause Northern and Southern Italy developed in two politically and historically distinct
contexts, the outcomes are considerably different as well. HI scholars consider question
such as, why do similar actors’ policy choices differ in response to similar events? (i.e.
oil shocks of 1979, tax policy, neoliberal globalization) (Katzenstein 1978; Steinmo 1996;
Thelen 1997). Our expectations are often shaped by our past experience, and thus, norms
and behaviors (tax morale) in Northern Italy might seem irrational in Southern Italy where
the political context differs substantially (Steinmo 2008, 164). Interests are created and
evolve within particular contexts, thus taxpayer objectives might be to provide adequate
revenue in Lombardia where public services are provided efficiently; however, a taxpayer
in Southern Italy might evade taxes in Campania where public services are often the result
of clientelistic politicians and low incomes.
Along similar lines, critical junctures or formative moments, usually during policy for-
mation, guide a policy down a certain path which produce particular outcomes (Capoccia
and Kelemen 2007; Collier and Collier 2002). They need not affect all institutions of a
system equally; in fact, a critical juncture might occur in one aspect of a system, but at
the same time remain relatively stable throughout other arenas. Reemerging structural con-
straints are then directly correlated to the duration of a critical juncture. Relatedly, Orren
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and Skowronek (1996) describe intercurrence as different political orders overlapping or
coexisting, sometimes as as a result of lingering vestiges of an older political system. Sub-
stantial events in Italian history, such as Unification, do not necessarily constitute a critical
juncture throughout the entire political system, but can affect individual aspects of the sys-
tem. According to Copoccia et al. (2007),
While relevant events happening at one of these levels of analysis may influ-
ence others, analytically it is important to keep them separate and to identify
the critical juncture clearly with respect to the development of a specific unit
of analysis.
Two features of politics are particularly important, according to Orren and Skowronek:
1) Institutions arise at different times and out of different historical circumstances. Emerg-
ing out of two different political circumstance, the institutions of Northern and Southern
Italy have developed different configurations; and 2) interaction between different institu-
tional orders is an important source of change. (Orren and Skowronek 1994; Thelen 1997).
Therefore, change is possible within path dependent systems. Path dependency, according
to Thelen (1997, 334),“involves elements of both continuity and (structured) change; and
institutional arrangements cannot be understood in isolation from the political and social
setting in which they are embedded.”
Specific timing and sequences of events can mold present political situations, suggest-
ing that path dependency, often used by historical institutionalists, offers a relevant lens
for examining Italian public spirit and taxation (Pierson 2000). Borrowed from economics,
HI scholars suggest that once a path is taken, it becomes increasingly difficult to deviate
from that path. One possible explanation for regional disparities in Italian taxpayer be-
12
havior is a history of republicanism and good governance in the North, dating back to the
thirteenth century, shaped present levels of social capital and civic virtue. As the North
continued down this path of republicanism and civicness, the chance of deflection became
increasingly narrow. In regards to autocratic governance and amoral familialism, the same
deterministic trajectory can be predicted. Pierson and Skocpol (2002) suggest that citi-
zens’ way of thinking about the world becomes self-reinforcing. In other words, once a
pattern and a path is established it becomes difficult to stray from that path, affecting even
citizens’ behaviors. A multitude of scholars use path dependency to demonstrate diverg-
ing outcomes in similar policy arenas; Hacker (2000) demonstrates diverse developmental
paths of employer-based healthcare policies vs. public-based healthcare policies in the US;
Others have used this approach to compare policy outcomes of like cases across countries.
From a path dependent framework political institutions are acutely resistant to change.
(Ertman 1997; Gerschenkron 1962; Kurth 1979; Steinmo 1996, 2010).
Path dependency indicates that state development is largely constrained by certain key
punctuations in a states’ institutional formation. Within a state’s particular historical con-
text they continue to evolve with multiple interacting variables producing emergent out-
comes (Steinmo 2010; Thelen 1997). This is not to say that institutions can only go down
one path, but rather can proceed across a number of different paths contingent on the inter-
action between the actors and their environments (Steinmo 2003). Two different levels of
taxpayer behavior can thus be the result of northern institutions taking one particular path,
whereas Southern institutions took a separate path determined by the interaction of certain
actors in their given environments.
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In other words, once a path is taken at a critical moment in a policy’s or an actor’s
history, that path becomes increasingly costly to diverge from. The metaphor of a tree
climber and the possibility of choosing several different branches on a single trunk has
often been evoked to explain that a climber’s best option to move back down the tree is to
continue on the same branch, instead of changing branches (Levi 1997; Steinmo 2010). As
an individual, an institution, or a policy moves further down a particular path, the cost of
changing paths greatly increases. The history of the “QWERTY” keyboard, presented by
Paul David (1985), is a classic example of lock-in. The “QWERTY” keyboard is largely
inferior to the keyboard created by August Dvorak, but we are locked into the “QWERTY”
keyboard because very few people have ever heard of the Dvorak keyboard. But very few
people have ever heard of the Dvorak keyboard because it is hard to find, and it is hard to
find because very few people have heard of it. In this case, timing was more important than
efficiency (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995).
A less deterministic interpretation of path dependency uses feedback mechanisms in-
stead of lock-in. For Pierson and Skocpol (2002) “outcomes at a ‘critical juncture’ trigger
feedback mechanisms that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern into the future.”
Much of the political costs associated with increasing returns are the result of institutions
generating a set of beneficiaries, which renders diverging from the status quo burdensome
on particular political allies. Social Security and Medicare in the United States are pro-
grams that are particularly resistant to change because those who benefit from these pro-
grams constitute such a large voting block. Policies that generate strong emotional attach-
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ment and cultural attitudes, ranging from ideological understandings to the way we perceive
our government, tend to be persistent (Pierson 1994).
Therefore, not only are institutions and policies subject to increasing returns and path
dependency, but political cultures and ideas are difficult to change once established (Pierson
2000). This is particular relevant to the study of tax morale and differing cultural attitude to-
wards taxation found between Northern and Southern Italy. Northern attitudes concerning
taxation and their compliance rates can be attributed to path dependent attitudes regarding
the government, in general. For example, Siena, a city that was a symbol of republicanism,
is home to the Sala della Pace, a painted room in the city’s town hall. The painted room
depicts two different settings: The Well-Governed City and the Ill-Governed City. In the
illustration of the Well-Governed City, dancers, artisans, and industrious and prosperous
farmers are seen together. In the Ill-Governed City a tyrant rules over the violent land-
scape, while soldiers are seizing a woman (Gilmour 2011). The idea of a well-governed
city dates back centuries in Siena to the classic Northern republics, while the South had a
very different experience with government. An idea or the perception of good govenrment
– whether or not it was actually good – can be as important as the reality of government.
The belief that public institutions benefit the individual can translate into a high degree of
social trust and solidarity; all of which contributes to a more civicminded citiznery.
Many HI scholars argue that change is the result of punctuated equilibrium; policies
remain in equilibrium until actors in a specific environment shift the path and a new equi-
librium is formed (Baumgartner and Jones 2010). Sudden punctuations then become the
intervening variable affecting political change. Peters and King (2005) examine work-
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fare reform, administrative reform, and states’ shifts from Keynesianism to Monetarism,
suggesting that a path dependent relationship in each of these policy areas, driven by spe-
cific economic and political punctuations, was the driving force behind the policy changes.
Steinmo (2008) suggests, however, “from an evolutionary perspective, change is the normal
state — not something that is punctuated occasionally.” Political systems evolve constantly,
adapting to contextual change.
Evolutionary theory and HI share many theoretical components, including the centrality
of history. Like HI, evolutionary theory implies that change and adaption are a constitu-
tive aspect of political life. The idea that change is more likely than equilibrium contrasts
with the punctuated equilibrium theories mentioned above. In both evolutionary theory
and HI, what happens at one point in time can have considerable effects on what happens
at a later point. History, therefore, is non-linear and is contigent on the ways in which hu-
man agents adapt to their environment (Steinmo 2003). Considering tax morale, evasion,
and compliance as an outcome of institutional capacity shaped by a specific historical con-
text, provides a fruitful compliment to the more individualistic social capital and cultural
frameworks that I will discuss next.
This study fulfills the characteristics outlined by Skocpol and Pierson and expands on it
by not only studying taxpayer behavior at the macro-level, but rather at the micro-level, as
well. Historical institutionalists’ large catalogue of research, employing historical institu-
tionalism, often addresses tax policy comparatively; however, they have not, until recently,
addressed the more micro-level issues concerning why taxpayers do or do not pay, and
how this can affect institutions. Explaining not only how institutions shape and constrain
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behavior, but also how individual and societal rules and norms impact deeply engrained
institutions, such as clientelism in Southern Italy is typically neglected in the HI litera-
ture. Historical institutionalists have a difficult time explaining the micro-level approaches.
Studies, such as this, are necessary for a more multidimensional understanding of political
life. History, institutions, citizens’ preferences, and policy all interact to shape certain pol-
icy choices (Steinmo 2014). In the following section, I outline the more micro-level aspect
of this study: civic culture.
2.2 Civic Culture
Since Almond and Verba’s influential study, which investigated distinctive features of
national and regional populations, also termed civic culture, a plethora of literature has
drawn from their study suggesting civic culture affects democratic and economic perfor-
mance. The “civic culture” represents those cultures that demonstrate high civicness, share
a basic consensus for the legitimacy of political institutions and public policy, while demon-
strating political competence and a trust in others (Almond and Verba 1963). A democratic
civic culture should further support beliefs and attitudes that increase civic participation
(Docherty, Goodlad, and Paddison 2010).
Based on survey questions concerning levels of political participation, openness, and
political awareness in Great Britain, United States, Germany, Italy, and Mexico, Almond
and Verba conclude that civic culture varies significantly between countries, which in turn,
affects their likelihood of a successful democratic future. As expected, the US, Great
Britain, and Germany perform quite well, while civic culture in Italy and Mexico is much
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lower. Analyzing Great Britain and Italy, Great Britain was more civic than Italy on ev-
ery measure in 1959. Only 16% of Italians read newspapers weekly in 1959, compared to
43% of Britons. 68% of Britons and 36% of Italians followed politics regularly. Only 3%
of Italians suggest that they have pride in their institutions, whereas 46% of Britons were
proud of their institutions. However, 25% of Italians and 10% of Britons were proud of the
countries physical attributes. In fact, Almond and Verba (1963,103) ,
Americans and the British with greatest frequency take pride in their politi-
cal systems, social legislation, and international prestige. Italians in the over-
whelming majority take no pride in their political system, nor even in their
economy. To the extent that they have national pride at all, it is in their history,
the physical beauty of their country, or in the fact of being Italian. Thus the
picture of Italian alienation is deepened.
Italians overwhelmingly did not believe that taking part in the local community was an
important aspect of citizenship, but neither did the Britons. Regarding national and local
civic competence, Italians fared much worse than the Britons. The same is true concerning
the numbers of associations in which respondents belong. A major claim of this disser-
tation is that Italians are alienated from the political process, rendering them a low trust
(especially outward trust), fearful, and highly traditional familial society. Great Britain, on
the other hand, is differential, but highly participatory. They support political activity and
emotional involvement in elections. They are also proud of their system of government and
government performance.
The culturalist, “amoral familism”, argument proposed by Banfield (1967,83) to explain
diverging civic culture and quality of government between Northern and Southern Italy
suggests that the Southern ethos is to “maximize the material, short-run advantage of the
18
nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise.” Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti
(1994,88) referring to the civic culture found in the North states, “Participation in a civic
community is more public-spirited than that, more oriented to shared benefits. Citizens
in a civic community, through not selfless saints, regard the public domain as more than a
battle-ground for pursuing personal interests. ” Though the moralist/culturalist argument is
extensively used throughout the literature, it overlooks the role institutions have in shaping
a particular culture.
From Almond and Verba’s 1959 study, the argument can be made from survey re-
sponses that Italians demonstrate a severe distrust in their institutions, and thus choose
not to participate. In 1989, Almond and Verba edited a volume for which they invited
country scholars to update The Civic Culture. Thirty years of growth and democratic sta-
bility shaped Europe in ways which were not necessarily foreseen by the original authors.
Sani suggests that institutions go a long way in explaining political and civic culture in
Italy. When weighting the sample for partisan preference, civic culture, measured by Al-
mond and Verba, increased in Italy. Similarly, religious affiliation predicts a wide range
of attitudes on issues related to civic culture and partisan preference. Sani (1989) presents
survey data from 1975 of respondents who assign great responsibility to the government on
a host of issues from health care to inflation. The percent of respondents range from 67.4
on care for elderly and 81.1 on inflation; however, the percent that evaluate government
action positively ranges from 7.1% on inflation to 32% on taking care of the elderly, indi-
cating that although Italians believe it is the government’s responsibility to tackle certain
issues, they are pessimistic towards the possibility of the government actually addressing
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them efficiently. More recent studies that investigate civic culture briefly mention Almond
and Verba’s The Civic Culture, though they are more concerned with the more timely and
relevant concept of social capital. The following section will survey the social capital liter-
ature.
2.3 Social Capital
There is a nexus between culture or individual aspects of behavior that influence whether
an individual obeys certain tax laws and norms. At the individual level, I will use social
capital and civic/political culture to explain divergences in tax morale between Northern
and Southern Italy. Conceptualization of the term social capital can be traced back to
Alexis De Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America” and Carlo Cattaneo’s account of Italian
cities in “La Cittá come Principo Ideale delle Istorie Italiane.” Throughout the 1900s, it
was used by scholars such as John Dewey, although it lacked a clear, identifiable definition.
However, it was not until 1977 that James Coleman popularized the term and introduced
social capital to many academic disciplines. For Coleman, social capital was a necessary
and often overlooked counterpart to physical and human capital. Physical capital is the
result of changes in physical materials (i.e. tools); human capital is created by changes in
humans that induces increased skills, while social capital is the outcome of changes in so-
cial relations which facilitate action (Coleman 1988). According to Coleman (1988,S101),
“Just as physical capital and human capital facilitate productive activity, social capital does
as well.” Through trustworthiness, which is closely linked to social capital, transaction
costs, associated with any type of relationship between two or more actors, decreases.
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In 1986, Pierre Bourdieu compared social capital to cultural and economic capital,
widening the academic scope of the concept to include more critical/Marxist explanations.
Bourdieu’s interpretation of social capital emphasizes the durability of networks and what
he refers to as collectively owned capital. He contends that differential access to economic,
cultural, and social capital determine societal relations (Bourdieu 1986). Bourdieu’s con-
ceptualization is more structural in nature and related to the “aggregate of resources” asso-
ciated with being part of a network.
The most well known studies on social capital, amongst political scientists, have been
conducted by Robert Putnam and his colleagues. According Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti
(Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994,1), social capital comprises “features of social life
networks, norms, and trust that enable participants to act together more effectively to pur-
sue shared objectives.” Putnam’s conceptualization of social capital is more similar to
Coleman’s than Bourdieu’s in that he borrows from the rational choice school of thought.
For Putnam, social capital is both private and individualistic. Individuals form networks
and associations out of pure self-interest, which in turn, can produce positive externalities
for the entire community. This can take many forms, but one example, might be joining
a local cultural association as an immigrant to better integrate oneself into the local com-
munity, at the same time, familiarizing the community with outside cultures and increased
tolerance (Putnam 2000). The basic premise for the relationship between social capital and
development is that a participatory environment which fosters shared norms and reciprocity
is likely to create a circular pattern where repeated interactions increase one’s reputation,
and one’s reputation increases one’s interactions (Sabatini 2006).
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Specific reciprocity occurs when an individual does something in return for someone
doing something for him. A does a favor for B, thus B returns the favor. This is a valu-
able form of social capital, but generalized reciprocity provides an even greater utility.
Generalized reciprocity relates to the Pay it forward principle; A does something for B
without the expectation of B returning that favor, but with the belief that someone else
will eventually do something for A (Putnam 2000). This takes a considerable amount of
generalized trust from person A as well. Let us step back to the immigrant who joined
the local cultural community and assume that this is an American with Sicilian ancestry
joining a local Sicilian cultural association. Before he joined the group there was a dis-
tinct individualized trust. Each member of the group trusts each other, because they come
from the same community, but have a general distrust of outsiders, especially immigrants;
however, once an immigrant joins the groups, a generalized sense of trust begins to form
as greater tolerance and understanding is fostered through cultural exchange. Before the
immigrant joined the community, the association can be characterized by having a high
amount of social capital, but a type of social capital leading to the exclusion of outsiders
and punishment of those who deviate from the communities social norms (Portes 2000).
Therefore, social capital does not always lead to optimum outcomes, but can rather lead to
strong out-group antagonism. As generalized trust grows, so does generalized reciprocity,
producing a sense of mutual “obligation and responsibility” (Putnam 2000,21). Promoting
a sense of mutual obligation and responsibility has important implications for cultivating
responsible taxpayers, and hence, increased levels of tax morale.
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Since Putnam, scholars have used social capital to explain a multitude of different so-
cial phenomena from micro-finance in economics to the quality and quantity of Facebook
friends and connections; probably most significant has been its emphasis in development
studies. Political scientists often employ the term to label a group of citizens within a nation
as virtuous or embodying civic virtue, especially in regards to voter participation, law abid-
ance, cooperation, and honesty of public officials (Fukuyama 1995b; Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales 2010; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994). Eric M. Uslaner (2009), in a Hand-
book of Social Capital, argues that social capital, operationalized as trust, has a significant
affect on corruption by reducing inequality. For Uslaner (2009), operationalized trust is
“the value that is predicated upon the belief that many others are part of your community.
This is the foundation of a ‘well-ordered’ society.” The opposite of this, which I defined as
individualized trust above, he defines as particularized trust. Diego Gambetta (1996) argues
that the Sicilian mafia materialized in Southern Italy as a result of an excessive amount of
in-group ties, and weak out-group ties. This relates back to Banfield’s “amoral familial”,
which has made a large, albeit controversial, contribution to the scholarly literature and the
southern question (Banfield 1967).
For Fukuyama (2001), social capital is an “instantiated norm that promotes reciprocity
between two or more individuals,” and therefore, many of the concepts often used to repre-
sent social capital (i.e. trust, networks, civic society) are outputs of social capital. Because
political scientists often use certain variables, such as trust, as a proxy, the political sci-
ence literature has drawn heavy criticism from other fields (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
2010). The critics argue that endogeneity arises when many of these proxy variables are
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considered. For example, does trust create less crime or does less crime initiate greater
trust? There seems to be confusion between inputs and outputs or as Edwards and Foley
(1997) put it, this “makes it impossible to separate what it is from what it does.”
Although using these variables to represent social capital has evoked criticism, readily
available survey data renders those projects feasible and valuable when coupled with other
methodological techniques. Francisco Herreros (2009) makes two novel hypotheses. First,
the state can actually promote social capital by acting as an enforcer of agreements. Many
who study social capital argue that the state actually reduces social capital or has no role
in fostering it (Padgen 1988; Putnam 2000; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994). Second,
by fostering equality the state can promote trust. Under circumstances in which there is an
efficient state which can enforce contracts, social capital and trust is much more likely to
flourish than in regions in which there is an inefficient state; Italy is a good representation
of this. The inefficient state creates a situation in which high trusters and trustworthy ac-
tors are crowded out and low trusters and opportunistic actors will survive. In Herreros’
(2009) multilevel model, using trust from the World Values Survey as a dependent variable
and country indicators as contextual level variables, he demonstrates that the more efficient
the public institutions, the higher level of interpersonal trust the respondent will have. In
addition, by controlling for the type of welfare state, he finds that respondents in social-
democratic, universalistic welfare-states are more trusting because of the relative equality
that it provides. This is in strong contrast to the fragmented welfare state found in Italy.
Italy, being a single nation-state, provides optimal conditions for researches to study insti-
tutional effects on social capital, and thus, tax morale. Because Italy is a single country
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with universal norms and customs, one can control for many societal and cultural factors
that might influence social capital, but let institutional performance vary by region, parsing
out the effects of institutions on social capital.
Herreros’ study mirrors what Michael Woolcock (1998) calls the liberal social capital
enthusiasts school of thought. The enthusiasts argue that the state can actively foster social
capital and a more civic culture by implementing programs that support such communitar-
ian behavior. Skocpol (1996) proposes that the state actually works in lockstep with civil
society, instead of contrary to these organizations. For example, the government of Bogotá
has recently implemented programs aimed at fostering a more virtuous civic culture and
“taxpayer culture” designed to teach citizens about their responsibilities as citizens. Sev-
eral slogans were adopted that embody communitarianism: “110% with Bogotá and all pay,
all gain”. State revenues have increased 29% since these measures were taken, suggesting
that the state can play an active role in enriching social capital; however, as both Putnam
(2000) and Fukuyama (2001) observed, social capital is not always positive (Ferro 2011).
Banfield (1967) noted very early and later Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1994), strong
inward facing connections can affect development negatively. Bonding ties, as Putnam de-
fines them, “emphasize family relations to the exclusion of all others” (Fukuyama 1995a).
Non-familial ties, rather, create trust and tolerance, which is a crucial aspect of develop-
ment. Fukuyama (1995a) proceeds to classify Italy as a society characterized by deep-
seated familial ties, however, weak outward linkages, which in turn, has undetermined the
growth of a strong civil society.
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Putnam’s distinction between bridging and bonding social capital distinguishes nega-
tive from positive social capital: Bridging refers to associations between people of different
socioeconomic and ethnic groups, whereas bonding relates to inward facing organizations
such as ethnic fraternal organizations and country clubs. Putnam (2000,22-23) illustrates
as “bonding constitutes the kind of sociological superglue, whereas bridging provides a
sociological WD40.” Because bonding can result in strong out-group antagonism and dis-
trust, tax morale could be negatively affected; bridging should have a positive effect on tax
morale. Since it is difficult to separate differences in levels of bonding and bridging through
survey data, social capital literature distinguishing between the two is quite scarce. How-
ever, since Making Democracy Work, a multitude of more recent studies have improved
on Putnam and his colleagues’ work, utilizing more advanced methodological techniques
and more uptodate data, while reaching similar conclusions. Many of these studies not
only look at common measures of social capital (i.e. trust), but also the less often studied
“structural” aspects of social capital such as bonding and bridging.
Fabio Sabatini (2005a,b, 2006) has erected a large catalogue of work uncovering a novel
approach in testing the theoretical foundations of Putnam et. al’s research. The analyses
in many of his social capital studies are based on a dataset constructed by the author, in-
cluding approximately 200 variables, which measure the “structural” dimensions of social
capital. According to Sabatini (2005a) “an operational definition of social capital as for-
mal and informal networks of agents sharing definite interests is provided, thus excluding
from the measurement toolbox the concept of trust and all indirect indicators popularized
by the empirical literature.” Exploiting a set of surveys from the Italian National Bureau of
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Statistics (ISTAT), he performs Principle Component Analyses to build measures of bond-
ing social capital, bridging social capital, and linking social capital. Linking social capital
is an area that is not typically mentioned in the literature, but for Sabatini is an important
type of social capital. Linking social capital refers to weak formal ties linking different
socioeconomic backgrounds mainly through voluntary organizations. Sabatini establishes
that higher bridging in the North of Italy was positively correlated with several indicators of
development. In the South, higher levels of bonding were negatively correlated with those
same indicators. Strong family ties exert a negative influence on human development and
economic performance. Weak ties may act as bridges across differing communities fos-
tering knowledge sharing and the diffusion of trust, and therefore, benefiting the process
of economic development. Bridging negatively affects income and development, while
linking has a positive effect (Sabatini 2005a,b, 2006).
Guido De Blasio and Nuzzo (2006), using the Bank of Italy Survey of Household
Wealth and Income and Putnam et. al’s regional data for the period following the 1870
unification, provide empirical evidence to support Putnam et. al’s findings. They con-
clude that there is strong support for a relationship between Putnam et. al’s 19th century
variables (turnout in local elections between fascism and the density of local elections)
and current social capital, reinforcing the path dependency argument. To further buttress
Putnam’s claims, the authors find that 19th century variables are unrelated to economic per-
formance (labor productivity, likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur, and the probability
for a woman to participate in the labor market), except through the persistence of social
capital. Specifically, they conclude that moving from the the average southern province to
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the average northern province will increase labor productivity by 12%, the likelihood of
becoming an entrepreneur by 4%, and the probability of a woman joining the labor force
by 13%, when all other variables are held constant. They also find evidence to support that
the northern communal republics were significantly more endowed with social capital than
the Kingdom of Sicily.
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) suggest that the path dependent nature of social
capital can be linked to intergenerational transmission of priors regarding the trustworthi-
ness of others. They, however, define social capital as “good” culture, or a set of beliefs and
values that facilitate cooperation among the members of a community (Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales 2008,296). In other words, parents transmit values about trust and coopera-
tion to their children, who then experience these values for themselves and pass them on to
their own children; this is one explanation for the persistence today of a gap in social cap-
ital found between what were once free-city states in Northern Italy and autocratic states
in the South during the medieval period. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) further find
that culture does indeed affect trust, which in turn, affects trade and investment. Guido
Tabellini (2010) probes even further by exploring the effects of certain cultural traits on
economic development through institutions. Tabellini argues that cultural differences bring
about regional disparities in the same formal institutions with culture being key interacting
variable between past institutions and the functioning of current institutions. Specifically,
he finds evidence to support that trust (i.e. social capital) and respect seem to be the most
favorable to economic development. In addition, the author uncovers control of one’s life
and obedience to positively affect development.
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Another unprecedented study conducted by Maria Bigoni et al. (2013), entitled “Coop-
eration Hidden Frontiers: The Behavioral Foundations of the Italian North South Divide,”
utilizes in-depth experiments in four Italian cities (two in the North and two in the South)
representative of the Italian population. The authors examined whether differences in co-
operation rely on differences in individual traits (i.e. Banfield and Putnam) or are the result
of properties of society (values and norms). Typically these studies are conducted within a
university setting making them unrepresentative of the entire population; however, the au-
thors were able to capture a far more representative sample for this research. The measures
were based on a three-player trust game, a public good game, and a set of dictator games.
This coupled with an historical record about the quality of institutions, renders this study
a highly valuable contribution to the literature. They demonstrate that trust and contribu-
tions are higher in the North than in the South; however, the observed gap is more due to
properties of society, than due to individual “moral flaws”. Bigoni et al. (2013,17) suggest,
“The fact that 150 years of common history in terms of formal institutions and language
have failed to achieve full convergence in cooperation levels suggests that the source of
persistence is to be sought in values and norms.”
Although the political science and economics disciplines have been largely supportive
of moralist arguments, several authors have argued that politics and the quality of insti-
tutions are more important for economic performance and good governance (Levi 1996;
Sabetti 2000; Tarrow 1996). Sidney Tarrow (1996) points out that throughout the 1990s
there had been a large growth in civic associations and civic culture throughout the South,
while at the same time the North was flush with corruption scandals. He further argues
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that Putnam et al. oversimplifies the regions of the North by collapsing Northern regions
with long republican histories with regions with relatively short republican histories into
one variable. Tarrow (1996,393) argues,
it would have been interesting to know by what rules of inference he chose
the late-medieval period as the place to look for the source of northern Italy’s
twentieth-century civic superiority. Why not look to the region’s sixteenth-
century collapse at the hands of more robust European monarchies; at its nineteenth-
century conquest of the South; at its 1919-21 generation of fascism; or at its
1980s corruption-fed economic growth? None of these phenomena were ex-
actly “civic” by what rules of evidence are they less relevant in “explaining”
the northern regions’ civic superiority over the South than the period 800 years
ago when republican government briefly appeared in its cities?
Tarrow (1996,304) further suggests instead of civic culture shaping government perfor-
mance, the more likely correlation should be between progressive politics and government
performance.
It has been argued elsewhere that Putnam and colleagues confound explantations with
outcomes, suggesting that civic-minded public officials are responsible for a civic citizenry.
Levi (1996) suggests that governments’ ability to protect property rights and merit based
societies (opposed to the clientelism or nepotism found in southern Italy) instill a gener-
alized trust in society. In a Hobbesian world in which there is an absence of an effective
state a power vacuum is left behind in which non-governmental actors (i.e. the Mafia)
often fill that void, leading to highly corrupt (low-trust) societies. Filippo Sabetti (2000)
contends that examining the North and the South at such a macro level is also problem-
atic. The regional intricacies of Italian governance cannot be broken down into only two
parts, rather one must study each regions’ rich historical diversity. In addition, Putnam’s
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twelve indicators of regional performance cannot be applied to all regions reliably. Sabetti
(2000) contends that the growth of institutions and ecclesial infrastructure since the eigh-
teenth century better explain the Italian political economy than the “amoral famililism” of
Putnam. By locating my study within these two frameworks, institutions and culture, I
can examine the historical relevance of institutions in building social capital and civicness,
while at the same time, breaking down tax morale into its constituent parts.
2.4 Tax Evasion, Compliance, and Morale
The relationship between taxpayer and government rests on an exchange relationship
as well as coercion (Spicer and Becker 1980). Taxpayers contribute to the revenue stream
in return for certain government benefits; the state, in turn, uses its coercive powers to
assure citizens are contributing to the public good. Becker’s economics of crime model
gave rise to a deterrence/coercion model, originally applied to tax compliance and evasion
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). They argue that tax evasion is negatively correlated
with the probability of detection and the degree of punishment, that is, as a result of utility
maximizing. When taxpayers gain richly from noncompliance, see little threat of detection,
and will receive weak punishment, many will evade taxes. Spicer and Becker (1980),
suggest that inequity does contribute to evasion because citizens who feel they are being
treated inequitably are more likely to feel angry, while those who perceive themselves
advantaged by inequity are more likely to feel guilt. Spicer and Becker hypothesize that
if taxpayers perceive inequity in their terms of trade with government, they will attempt
to restore equity by adjusting the amount of taxes they evade. Their taxpayer simulation
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showed perceived relative tax rate as statistically significant and positive, with females
evading less than their male counterparts.
Using IRS data, Dubin and Wilde (1988) use classical tax evasion theory to examine
the effects of auditing on compliance. They theorize that the IRS is a strategic actor in the
taxpayer-government relationship; audits have a deterrent effect on noncompliance; several
socioeconomic factors have significant hidden costs for compliance; and increases in the
unemployment rate reduce the level of compliance (Dubin and Wilde 1988). Their analysis
evoked criticism from scholars arguing that coercion models greatly over-predict evasion.
Evasion is rarer than compliance, even with relatively low risk of detection. Scholars began
to examine other explanations for compliance.
Erard and Feinstein (1994) utilize game theory to challenge the dominant coercion/deterrence
model, arguing that including honest taxpayers alters the tax compliance game. They iden-
tify perceptions of fairness of the tax code and a taxpayer’s reactions to government policies
as significant factors in this game. In a subsequent study Erard and Feinstein (1994) ex-
plore taxpayers’ moral sentiments about tax compliance. They demonstrate that the United
States had an average audit rate of 2.7% but that the mean expectation among respondents
predicted a 72% audit rate and that guilt and shame are important determinants of tax re-
porting behavior.
Although utility maximization approaches have begun to account for small instances
of moral sentiments, many scholars denounce the idea that individuals are amoral utility
maximizers. Pyle (1991,173) asserts, “Casual observation suggests that not all individuals
think quite like that. Indeed, it seems that whilst the odds are heavily in favor of evaders
32
getting away with it, the vast majority of taxpayers behave honestly.” Economic psychol-
ogists have used different experimental methods to predict the likelihood of tax evasion.
Typically, economic psychologists confront a small sample of individuals (usually college
students) with a specific financial scenario. In Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach,
Webley et al. (2010) use cross-national experimental simulations and come to the conclu-
sion that competition between taxpayers, alienation, and social orientation are significantly
related to tax evasion; however, inequity shows no correlation. Building on the classical
model and improving on the framework, Traxler (2010) establishes that tax compliance can
remain high with weak tax enforcement. In addition, beliefs concerning other individual
taxpayer behavior affect tax compliance.
Since the 1990s, the tax compliance/evasion scholars have utilized a variety of datasets,
mainly surveys that ask questions that can be used as proxies for tax morale. Using a British
Social Attitudes Survey, Orviska and Hudson (2003) determine that law abidance has a
positive effect on tax morale. Benno Torgler’s recent work on tax morale examines a variety
of different scenarios in a number of different countries, using a variety of surveys and
taxpayer scenarios (Schaltegger and Torgler 2007; Torgler 2002, 2003, 2005). Schaltegger
and Torgler (2007) use the World Values Survey, the Latinobarometer, and a controlled field
experiment in Switzerland in which a test group of citizens receive a letter from the Swiss
government outlining the importance of paying taxes. They found that rate of taxation is
generally not significant while trust in the legal system is highly significant. This fits the
argument of Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1994), who find an association between high
levels of social capital and stronger economic performance. Similarly, direct democracy
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and referendum voting increase citizens’ information, which, in turn, affects tax morale.
Citizens who take an active role in policy decisions might also be more likely to contribute
to their communities (Alm and Torgler 2006; Feld and Kirchgässner 2000; Hug and Spörri
2011; Torgler 2005).
A high level of governmental autonomy also has significant effects on tax morale. As
governments approach more decentralized forms of government, the likelihood of evasion
decreases, demonstrating that institutional structures can shape taxpayer behavior. Exploit-
ing the Latinobarometer and European Social Survey, scholars find that trust in the presi-
dent/politicians and pro-democratic attitudes are also associated with high tax morale; As
tax protests during the Vietnam War reflect, tax evasion can be a form of political protest
(Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2010; Torgler and Schneider 2007a). These findings suggest
that citizens’ perceptions of their government institutions and those regimes that control
their political system affect their willingness to pay taxes.
Many socio-demographic variables are statistically significant for tax morale as well.
Field and experimental research has shown that women in advanced and industrialized so-
cieties are less likely to evade taxes (Giese and Hoffmann 2000; Torgler 2002)). In a study
that uses Albania as a case study, Gërxhani (2007) notes that most explanations for these
differences reference biology or socioeconomic conditions. Building on the work of Fer-
ber and Nelson (2003), she argues that “gender differences, together with class, ethnic, and
age differences, relate to legal arrangements, power differences, the historical division of
labor, economic incentive patterns, and institutional arrangements” (120). She argues that
biology and socioeconomic conditions blend in institutions that are not gender-neutral, but
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are rather a reflection of centuries of biological and socioeconomic arrangements, and that
therefore explanations that make reference to only one of these factors are insufficient. This
work begins to unravel the complexity of the relationship between gender and institutions,
which may reveal the significant of other prominent socio-demographics.
Research exploring the effects of education and income on tax morale have had varying
results. Some find a positive relationship between educational levels and tax compliance
(Friedland, Maital, and Rutenberg 1978; Wallschutzky 1984). One study, which samples
426 Swedish males, establishes a negative relationship (Wärneryd and Walerud 1982). Yet
Milliron (1985), who samples 34 randomly selected adults from a jury duty pool in Las An-
geles, performing taxpayer simulations, finds no relationship. Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas
(2010) concur with Wärneryd and Walerud, finding negative results for education. Ross
and McGee (2011) utilized survey methods to examine the relationship in six countries, the
United States, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Germany, with varying results. China was
the most adverse to tax evasion, possibly due to strict enforcement by the state, followed
by the United States and Germany. US women were the only women surveyed to have a
statistically significant, consistent opposition to tax evasion across education levels. Oppo-
sition to tax evasion and correlations between tax morale and education also varied from
country to country. In the United States and India, the most educated had the greatest op-
position to tax evasion. In Brazil, Russia, and China, it came from the least educated. Ross
and McGee conclude that culture, history, politics, and economics contribute to diverging
attitudes toward tax evasion. Using the 2004 Bank of Italy Survey of Household Wealth
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and Income, Filippin, Fiorio, and Viviano (2013) suggest that education is an important
predictor of tax morale and positively correlated in Italy.
Studies that address the relationship between tax evasion and income show more consis-
tent results. The literature reflects a consensus that there is typically a negative relationship
between relative income and tax evasion and that taxpayers will be risk averse. Utilizing
a reference-dependent approach, which stipulates that a behavior depends on a reference
point, Rablen (2010) analyzes income distribution of tax evasion, finding that heterogeneity
and income distribution plays an important role, with evasion tied to the provision of the
public good. Since taxes typically reduce an individual’s take-home income, studies have
revealed that, particularly in federalist countries, individuals living in high-income regions
are more likely to evade taxes. High tax burdens are often associated with lower tax morale
as well (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2010).
Another socio-demographic factor that interacts with tax morale is age. Older people
have a more positive tax morale than younger people (Ross and McGee 2011; Torgler and
Schneider 2007a). Nordblom and Žamac (2012) argue that effects of age reflect evolving
norms throughout the life cycle. Braithwaite and Ahmed (2005) utilize cross-sectional data
from a survey of 447 recent college graduates in Australia, also making the claim that
greater tax morale is a function of age; Torgler and Valev (2010) use panel data to buttress
the connection.
Religion also has an effect on tax morale (Torgler and Schneider 2007a). In their six-
country study, Ross and McGee (2011) found Catholics were more opposed to tax eva-
sion than other religious groups, and Buddhists were least opposed. Stack and Kposowa
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(2006) utilized the World Values Survey, analyzing data on 45,728 individuals in 36 na-
tions; they controlled for other predictors of tax fraud acceptability (TFA), social bonds,
economic strain, and various other demographics. Presenting mixed aggregate results, they
concluded that within individual nations, “the presence of a ‘moral community’ (majority
of the population identifies with a religious group) explained 39 percent of the variation
in the presence or absence of the expected religiosity-TFA relationship.” Gentry and Kahn
(2009) utilize IRS and zip-code level data to examine the relationship of ideology and tax
morale, constructing a spatial understanding of tax sheltering in the United States. They
find places with voters who are either more conservative actually shelter less income (Gen-
try and Kahn 2009).
The present study focuses on Italy, and existent scholarship suggests income, age, ed-
ucation, and occupation type are all associated with Italian citizens’ perception of the se-
riousness of tax evasion. These studies show that higher tax morale correlates with in-
creased age and education and that self-employed individuals have the lowest levels of tax
morale (Barone and Mocetti 2011; Filippin, Fiorio, and Viviano 2013; Fiorio and Zanardi
2008; Luigi Cannari 2007). Fiorio and Zanardi (2008) find similar results, except that res-
idents living in Southern Italy do not recognize tax evasion as a serious concern. Another
significant deviation from broader findings reveals that Italian females tend to have lower
morale than males, although this finding may reflect the large income gap between men and
women, since it also shows a correlation between income and tax morale (Filippin, Fiorio,
and Viviano 2013). Barone and Mocetti (2011) reveal that public sector inefficiencies neg-
atively affect tax morale, which has important implications for state capacities. Filippin,
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Fiorio, and Viviano (2013) find that not only do respondents’ individual characteristics af-
fect tax morale, but contextual variables, such as tax enforcement, also predict tax morale.
These findings prompt the present study’s attempt to provide more holistic research into
the interaction of these variables and tax morale. The following chapters will uncover the
nexus between history, institutions, and civc responsibility and how these ties interact to
shape taxpayer behaviors.
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3. Testing the Amoral Familism
3.1 Bank of Italy Survey of Household Wealth and Income Data
This chapter examines individual level data to assess the regional effects of social cap-
ital and political culture on tax morale. I am interested in confirming the existing literature
that suggests Southern Italy is significantly lower than Northern Italy with regards to tax
morale, while adding several individual level hypotheses, most importantly that the South
evinces lower levels of civic culture and social capital. I argue, however, that cultural
backwardness, often referred to as amoral familism, cannot explain the intricacies of a
person’s tax behavior alone. Tax morale is constructed within a specific institutional envi-
ronment, reflecting the particular quality of institutions with which a citizen associates. In
other words, if the quality of institutions is so poor that circumventing laws is necessary to
accomplish simple functions, such as paying taxes, side-stepping the state is legitimized,
while the state itself is deligitimized. This then becomes a question of institutional effec-
tiveness, rather than cultural deficiency.
To test the hypothesis that tax morale is shaped by institutions, I use tax compliance
experiments conducted in Milan, Rome, and Bologna for which participants partook in
simple clerical tasks and were paid based on how well they performed those tasks. They
were then asked to report their incomes under three different scenarios, mimicking different
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types of tax regimes. Institutions were held constant throughout the experiment allowing
us to isolate cultural variation. Challenging the culturalist argument, we find no difference
in tax compliance when controlling for the institutional environment. Using Social Value
Orientation as a proxy for an individual’s civic consciousness we discern no differences
between the two regions.
Italy presents a crucial case for study tax morale because of the sizeable level of eva-
sion in the country. While Italy collects approximately 350 billion euros per year in tax
revenue, it loses an estimated 250 billion euros due to tax evasion and underground econ-
omy (Santoro 2010; World Development Indicators 2014). Other estimates place evasion
rates at 25%-30% of GDP. Some estimates of VAT evasion reach 40% of the taxable base,
and corporate evasion makes up approximately 27% of taxable revenue (Santoro 2010).
Estimates suggest that Italy fails to collect around 26% of the income tax its citizens
owe due to evasion. Considerable disparities register among different types of workers;
self-employed individuals and entrepreneurs evade approximately 60% of their income
taxes, while dependent workers only evade approximately 10%. Evasion rates vary in
different sectors of the economy as well; estimates suggest the agricultural sector evades
70.57% of regional production tax while the commercial sector evades 54.78% and the
business services sector evades 46.41%. Family services such as housekeepers and maids
evade approximately 42%. Construction sectors evade considerably less, 23.82%, and in-
dustrial sectors evade the least, 9.24% (Santoro 2010). In addition to industry variation,
research reveals regional variation. IRAP evasion ranges from 13% and 50% in north-
ern Italy, while southern regions vary from 54% to 94% (Calabria). Figure 3.1 presents all
40
regions by level of IRAP evasion. Considering the sheer size of evasion, its economic deter-
minants have grave importance, demanding holistic approaches that account for deterrence,
detection, and citizens’ social characteristics.
Figure 3.1.: Intensity of Evasion of IRAP by region 1998-2002
Scholars such as Edward Banfield, Francis Fukuyama, and Robert Putnam have all
employed cultural arguments to explain divergences in economic performance and govern-
ment effectiveness between the Italian regions (Banfield 1967; Fukuyama 1995b; Putnam,
Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994).In his influential study Making Democracy Work, Putnam sug-
gests that a long history of civic virtue and social capital in the Northern regions of Italy
is reflected in their past republican governments and their current institutions, whereas the
Southern regions can be characterized by strong familial, inward facing ties which mirrors
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their autocratic history and present development. Since Putnam, a multitude of studies have
tested the Southern Question.
If we apply this logic to taxpayer behavior, a more civic oriented individual would gain
utility by paying taxes because the increased wellbeing of their fellow citizens, as well
as the state would also increase their utility. A person who is less civic and has strong
inward facing ties would actually lose utility by paying taxes by decreasing the income of
the family unit, while benefiting others, including a state which is far removed from the
familial unit. We can express this in a basic utility function similar to that used by Murphy,
Ackermann, and Handgraaf (2011), but with an added family unit:
U(pisel f ,piother,pi f amily) = pisel f +α piother,+α pi f amily− tax (3.1)
where pisel f denotes the taxpayers payoff, piother indicates the payoffs to another person,
pi f amily signifies the payoffs to the taxpayers family, α measures the weight a taxpayer
puts on others or family’s wellbeing, and tax represents the amount of tax to be paid.
More balanced weights between family and other exemplifies a citizen with a high level
of bridging social capital. This is compared to a taxpayer who sacrifices the utility of
others, favoring a heavily weighted family utility.
To preview my main results, estimates from the Bank of Italy Survey suggest that tax
morale in the North is significantly higher than tax morale in the South, confirming the
existing literature. Social capital and civic culture are statistically significant and posi-
tive, and a t-test supports the hypothesis that the North is endowed with higher levels of
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both. There is a large body of literature demonstrating that the self-employed have lower
tax morale than employees, and I indeed determine this to be representative of the Italian
population as well. However, when controlling the environment in a controlled laboratory
setting, I discover no difference in tax compliance and other-regarding preferences between
the North and the South.
3.2 Methods
In the first part of this chapter, I use OLS models to examine the effects of social capital
and civic culture on tax morale. The Bank of Italy Survey of Household Wealth and In-
come, 2004 (BI), which analyzes wealth and income in Italy dating back to 1970, provides
the data. The survey is conducted every two years with a sample size of approximately
8,000 respondents. Based on the survey, this study examines three main hypotheses about
the effects of social capital and political culture on tax morale, listed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Statement of Hypotheses
H1 Because social capital, operationalized as number of associations, in-
creases an individuals other-regarding preferences, tax morale will also
increase.
H2 As civic culture, operationalized as interest in politics and honesty, in-
creases so will tax morale.
H3 Respondents living in Northern Italy will have greater bridging social
capital, thus living in the North will have a positive effect on tax morale,
whereas living in the South will have a negative effect on tax morale,
because of their preference for protecting the welbeing of the family
unit, while sacrificing other’s welbeing.
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The 2004 BI survey has a section pertaining exclusively to public spirit and taxation.
The study generated a random sample of 3,798 from its broader sample by selecting those
respondents who owned a home with an odd year of birth to partake in this section. It posed
a variety of questions regarding honesty, number of associations, perceptions of the extent
of evasion, and a number of questions referring to tax morale. I operationalized the concept
of tax morale by creating an index from Cronbach’s alpha using several questions, which
provided statements about Italy’s tax system and asked respondents to indicate their level
of agreement with the statements:
• The more someone earns, the more (in percentage) he/she should con-
tribute to Government spending
• Paying taxes is one of the basic duties of citizenship
• Not paying taxes is one of the worst crimes a person can commit because
it harms the whole community
• Even if someone thinks a tax is unfair, he/she should pay it first and then
complain if necessary
• It is right to pay tax because it helps the weak
• If everyone paid taxes, in the end we would all pay a little less
1= not at all; 5 = very much
I also used a variable to represent evasion, based on a question which requires respon-
dents to assess the seriousness of the problem of tax evasion in relation to other problems
facing the government, asking respondents to rate it as 1. Very serious, 2. Serious, 3. The
same as any other, 4. Marginal, or 5. Non-existent. The alpha score is .72 for the scale as a
whole, signifying a reliable scale. The index has a minimum value of -2.92 and a maximum
value of 1.13. At the 10th percentile, tax morale has a value of -.85, and a value of .75 at
the 90th percentile.
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The twenty Italian regions have been collapsed into two regions representing the tradi-
tional north and south divide in Italy. It could be argued that the regions of central Italy,
once controlled by the papacy, should also be represented here. I find no statistical differ-
ence between the once papal states and the more northern regions, therefore I believe there
is a strong argument for using the dichotomous region variable. My independent variables
are centered on the concepts of social capital and civic culture. I operationalize social cap-
ital and civic culture as interest in politics and number of associations. In addition, I have
created an index for honesty, consisting of not paying for public transportation and not
returning money found by accident. The alpha score is .82.
I control for self-employed respondents reflecting their consistently higher level of eva-
sion in Italy. Lastly, I will control for individual demographic variables. All descriptive
statistics for variables in the multivariate analysis are outlined in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Tax morale 0 0.617 -2.92 1.133 3798
Interest in Pol 1.877 0.894 1 4 3798
North 0.589 0.492 0 1 7687
Associations 1.141 0.348 1 2 3798
Sex 0.39 0.488 0 1 8012
Education 3.445 1.639 1 8 8012
Log income 10.086 0.66 5.521 13.838 8008
Self-employed 0.107 0.309 0 1 8012
Survey responses are not without bias, however. Self-reporting may cause respondents
to overstate their actual degree of compliance. Various studies addressing this upward
bias find that the average person tends to exaggerate his or her willingness to pay for a
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variety of goods and services when given hypothetical situations. Hypothetical bias applies
more strongly to private goods than to public goods, which could be related to an even
greater upward bias on tax morale questions. Hillman (2010) argues that survey responses
represent inconsequential expressive behavior because respondents are aware that answers
to survey questions will benefit them expressively, but have no effect on their material
utility. This can result in biased responses to tax morale questions because respondents’
material utility is not affected, as it would be in real world taxpayer situations. However,
the use of a multi-item scale increases the reliability of the measure by capturing the diverse
aspects of tax morale. The multi-item scale also tends to compensate for error in any single
item (Alm and Torgler 2006). Asking about tax morale is also less invasive than asking
about tax evading behavior, and should thus evince a higher degree of honesty. The fact
that the BI reveals significantly higher tax morale in the North than in the South further
verifies the validity of the measure, since this is consistent with other non-survey data on
tax evasion in Italy.
3.3 Results
Figure 3.2 represents significant differences between tax morale in the North and South
using a “difference-in-means” t-test. As the methodology section above describes, the tax
morale scale exploits several questions from the Bank of Italy survey of household wealth
and income to define citizens’ intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. This test estimates the
“true” population means of each group from the sample collected by the Bank of Italy
with confidence intervals. The p−value≤ 0.05 shows that the difference between the two
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is statistically significant and that the northern mean is definitely higher than that for the
South.
Figure 3.2.: Tax Morale Index: Mean Comparison between Respondents from Northern
and Southern Italy
To increase the intuition of the tax morale measure, I have also created three fictitious
names for three respondents at the 15th, 50th, and 85th percentiles: Giovanna, Mario, and
Salvo. Giovanna represents the 15th percentile with a tax morale score of -.64. She was
born in a city of less than 20,000 people in Abruzzo (South) and has a high school degree.
She believes that tax evasion is a serious crime; she does not think that people who earn
more should pay more; and she believes strongly that paying taxes is one of the basic duties
of citizenship. Giovanna also believes that not paying for your taxes is a very serious crime.
She responds 3, neutral, with respect to her level of agreement that a person should pay a
tax bill he or she considers unfair and then complain if necessary. Similarly, she does not
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agree that it is right to pay taxes because it helps the weak. Giovanna does feel very strongly
that if everyone paid their taxes then taxes would be lower for everyone.
Mario’s tax morale score of .02 represents the 50th percentile. He is 45 years old, from
a small town in the South, and has a high school degree. He believes that tax evasion
poses no significant problem for Italy. He also opposes progressive taxation, but believes
strongly that paying taxes is a basic duty of citizenship. Like Giovanna, he considers tax
evasion a serious crime. He feels very strongly that an individual should pay his or her
taxes, regardless of the consideration that they are unfair, and then complain later. He
indicates he feels neutrally about the statement that an individual should pay taxes because
it helps the weak. Lastly, he believes strongly that if everyone paid taxes it would reduce
the collective burden.
Salvo from Emilia Romagna (North) represents the 85th percentile with a tax morale
score of .61. Salvo is 57 from a small town and he has a bachelor’s degree. He thinks
that tax evasion is a very serious problem facing the country and he believes strongly in
progressive taxation for the wealthy. Like Mario and Giovanna, he feels very strongly that
paying taxes is a basic duty of citizenship and in the seriousness of evasion as a crime, and
agrees with Mario as to the strong obligation to pay a bill the taxpayer considers unfair.
Like Mario, Salvo is neutral about the statement that individuals should pay taxes because
it helps the weak, but feels very strongly that if everyone paid their taxes, it would reduce
the collective burden. I illustrate where each of these respondents fall on the tax morale
index in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3.: Tax Morale Scale Measures
To test the impact of region on tax morale I use a bivariate model, only analyzing the
effect of region on tax morale. The first column of Table 3.3 shows the North is robust at
the .05 level and positively correlated with tax morale, meaning respondents born in the
North have higher tax morale scores than respondents in the South. The coefficient implies
living in the North increases tax morale by .19 tax morale units. In other words, looking at
Figure 3.3 living in the north moves tax morale from the second to third quartile when all
else is held constant.
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Table 3.3: OLS Regression: Tax Morale
Dependent Variable: Tax Moral
(1) (2) (3) (4)
North 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.12***
(0.021) (0.02) (0.021) (0.020)
Associations 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.029) (0.029)
Interest in Politics 0.06*** 0.05***
(0.0114) (0.0122)
Honesty 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.011) (0.011)
Sex -0.09*** -0.08***
(0.0211) (0.0205)
Log income 0.05*** 0.02
(0.018) (0.018)
Education 0.03*** 0.02***
(0.00676) (0.00682)
Self-employed -0.22*** -0.21***
(0.03) (0.03)
Constant -0.11*** -0.37*** -0.67*** -0.5***
(0.016) (0.036) (0.170) (0.166)
N 3,660 3,660 3,658 3,658
R-squared 0.023 0.104 0.050 0.118
Standard errors (in parentheses)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
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Column 2 of Table 3.3 exhibits the results of my multivariate model adding my social
capital and civic culture variables. All social capital and civic culture variables are robust
and moving in the predicted direction; however, when controlling for social capital and
civic culture there is only a modest decrease in the North variable, suggesting that social
capital and civic culture account for only a small amount of the variation in the region
variable. Interest in politics is an important indicator of civic participation. Interest in
politics represents a general awareness and engagement with the political process; in this
regard, it is an important aspect of civic culture. The more a citizen is involved in the
political process the more likely they are to follow norms and rules, therefore increasing
their tax morale. The positive coefficient predicts that a one-unit increase in interest in
politics increases tax morale by .06 tax morale units. This implies that moving across
the range of interest in politics from not at all interested in politics (1) to fairly interested
in politics (3), tax morale moves from the second to third quartile when all else is held
constant. Honesty (see appendix for explanation) also proxies for civic culture, because
it indicates ones level of civic virtue and feelings about reciprocity. Here honesty has a
coefficient of .11, predicting as honesty increases by one unit, tax morale will also increase
by .16 units. More substantively, this means that as honesty moves from the 10th percentile
(-1.3) to the 90th (.64), tax morale changes from the second to the third quartile ceteris
paribus. These tests all support the hypothesis that increased social capital increases tax
morale, while also increasing tax morale across regions.
Social capital, represented by the number of associations to which a respondent be-
longs, is assessing the cooperative nature of a respondent and their outward ties, which can
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improve the efficiency of society (Putnam 1993, 126). The more an individual associates
with other individuals as part of a formal or semiformal organization (i.e. unions, environ-
mental clubs, etc...), the more emphasis will placed on piother in formula 1, and hence tax
morale will also increase. It is important that the weight is on outward facing ties (bridg-
ing), instead of inward looking ties (bonding). Bridging represents associations between
people of different socioeconomic and ethnic groups, whereas binding relates to inward
facing organizations such as ethnic fraternal organizations and country clubs. Because
bonding can result in strong out-group antagonism and distrust, tax morale could be nega-
tively affected; bridging should have a positive effect on tax morale. In the difference-in-
means t-test shown in Figure 3.4, Northern respondents frequent associations significantly
more than their Southern counterparts. I propose that Northerners’ social capital is not only
quantitatively different, but also qualitatively as demonstrated by Sabatini (2005a,b, 2006).
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Figure 3.4.: Number of association a respondent attends per year: Mean comparison be-
tween respondents in Northern and Southern Italy
In my individual level model, the coefficient is .15, indicating that a one unit increase
in associations increases tax morale by .15 tax morale units when all other variables are
held at their mean. The results suggest that social capital and civic culture variables have
a significant impact on tax morale. Specifically, knowledge sharing and the diffusion of
trust increases the more often a person attends formal or semi-formal associations, which
in turn, positively affects tax morale. If my tax morale is linked to the amount of utility that
I get from the betterment of societal position of others + family, taking part in associations
should, in theory, increase my tax morale.
In column 3 and 4 of Table 3.3 I add a set of demographic control variables: education,
self-employed, and income are all statistically significant, moving in the predicted direc-
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tion. Field and experimental research has shown that women in advanced and industrialized
societies are less likely to evade taxes (Giese and Hoffmann 2000; Torgler 2002). In a study
that uses Albania as a case study, Gërxhani (2007) notes that most explanations for these
differences reference biology or socioeconomic conditions. Building on the work of Ferber
and Nelson (2003), she argues that “gender differences, together with class, ethnic, and age
differences, relate to legal arrangements, power differences, the historical division of labor,
economic incentive patterns, and institutional arrangements” (120). However, contrary to
previously reviewed studies, sex is negative, signifying that women have lower tax morale
than men in Italy. This is possibly the result of two situations. First, income is positively
correlated with tax morale, thus as income increases, so does tax morale. The mean income
for females ise24,675, whereas mean income for males ise33,187. This large income gap
is one explanation for the lower tax morale among women. Second, males make up more
than half the respondents surveyed.
Research exploring the effects of education and income on tax morale have have varying
results. Some find a positive relationship between educational levels and tax compliance
(Friedland, Maital, and Rutenberg 1978; Wallschutzky 1984). One study, which samples
426 Swedish males, establishes a negative relationship (Wärneryd and Walerud 1982). Yet
Milliron (1985), who samples 34 randomly selected adults from a jury duty pool in Las
Angeles, performing taxpayer simulations, finds no relationship. Since self-employed in-
dividuals make-up a large portion of the Southern Italian workforce, this might further
explain the differences in tax morale.
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The results of the OLS regression models have many important implications for tax
policy in Italy. I have demonstrated that variables which represent social capital and civic
culture are significant predictors of an individual’s tax morale. Tax morale varies signif-
icantly between the North and South, as do social capital and civic cultural. Tax morale,
however, is sensitive to the context in which behaviors are formed. It is probable that tax
morale is largely a product of the public institutions with which citizens associate. If public
institutions in the South are less efficient than in the North and are run by corrupt officials,
chances are that they will also be less willing to support those institutions with their tax dol-
lars. Using tax compliance experiments I can test this hypothesis by holding the institutions
constant
3.4 Experimental Overview
Our experiments were conducted in three universities throughout Italy during the 2013-
2014 academic year. These universities use an electronic database to which the students or
past students voluntarily submit their information for participation in experiments. The par-
ticipants are then randomly selected and invited by email to partake in the experiment. Once
the participants arrive at the laboratory they are given an anonymized identification num-
ber and assigned to a partitioned computer to limit the interaction between themselves and
other participants. We link participant pay to id number thus ensuring complete anonymity.
We began the session by reading a short script introducing the participants to the experi-
ment. They were told that they will be asked to perform a series of simple clerical tasks and
make a series of decisions for which they will receive real Experimental Currency Units
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(ECUs) which will be converted into real money once the experiment is completed. Par-
ticipants could also choose to leave the experiment receiving a small show up payment of
5 euros. Once all tax compliance and SVO tasks were completed, respondents were ask to
complete a short survey.
This study is part of a larger cross-national project in which we perform experiments in
Italy, the United Kingdom, Sweden, the US, and Romania. Since I am only concerned here
with Italy, I have dropped a large portion of our observations. Our Italian participants were
specifically asked to state in which region they were born. For our study, there were 270
Italian subjects. In Table 3.4 I report the characteristics of our participants. The participants
in the North are demographically very similar to those in the South. In our pool the average
age was 23.87, 53% were male, just under a quarter were employed, and about 40% were
economics majors. Because there is a high proportion of economics majors, we control for
those participants in our individual models. The vast majority, 84%, of our subjects had
participated in experiments before. Northerners, however, are significantly more likely to
be employed and economics majors.
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Table 3.4: Summary of Participant Characteristics: North and South
North South Diff. in
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Mean Means
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male 277 0.54 0.50 1 0.53 0.57 -0.05
Age 277 23.87 3.57 18 73 23.96 23.72 0.24
Employed 276 0.21 0.41 1 0.26 0.12 0.14*
Past part 275 0.81 0.38 1 0.80 0.84 -0.04
Econ major 267 0.40 0.50 1 0.44 0.31 0.13*
Risk 268 5.23 2.36 1 10 5.28 5.19 0.09
Prosocial 278 0.35 0.48 1 0.35 0.38 -0.03
Individualist 278 0.61 0.49 1 0.61 0.61 0.00
I tested for differences in population means using Schlag’s Z-test (for dummy variables)
and t-tests (for continuous variables). An asterisk (*) indicates whether differences be-
tween countries are statistically significant at the 5% level.
To earn money, our subjects were asked to copy rows of data from a sheet of paper
to a computer. They would receive 10 ECUs for each row copied correctly, followed by
reporting round. In the reporting round, participants are asked to declare their income under
three different scenarios, mimicking actual tax regimes. Individuals are given free-reign to
declare anywhere from 0% - 100% of their income with a 5% probability of being audited.
There are a total of three clerical tasks, each followed by three reporting rounds. With each
reporting round the rules and redistribution vary slightly.
Figure 3.5.: Example Screenshot: Reporting Your Earnings
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In the rounds 1-3 we maintain a 30% flat tax rate, but vary how the money is redis-
tributed reflecting behaviors under different levels of efficiency. We hold redistribution
constant in rounds 4-6, but we introduce new tax rates. Lastly, rounds 7 and 8 are progres-
sive taxation rounds. In the first progressive round, the top 10% of incomes paid a 50% tax
rate, the bottom 10% paid a 10% tax rate, and everyone else paid a 30% tax rate. The pro-
gressive taxation round 8 is similar to a marginal tax system in that all incomes over 100
ECUs were taxed at 50%, incomes between 50-100 were taxed at 30%, and any income
under 50 was taxed at 10%. In the ninth and final round, we donate all revenue to a real
world charity.
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Table 3.5: Summary of Tax Reporting Rounds
Task Description
Clerical 1 Earn income that is reported in Rounds 1 through 3
Round 1: No Redistribution Flat tax rate of 30% on all reported income
Tax revenues are not redistributed
Round 2: Redistribution Flat tax rate of 30% on all reported income
Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, which is redistributed on an equal per
capita basis to all participants
Round 3: Redistribution x 2 Flat tax rate of 30% on all reported income
Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, the amount in the fund is doubled, and
then redistributed on an equal per capita basis to all participants
Clerical 2 Earn income that is reported in Rounds 4 through 6
Round 4: 10% Tax Rate Flat tax rate of 10% on all reported income
Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, the amount in the fund is doubled, and
then redistributed on an equal per capita basis to all participants
Round 5: 30% Tax Rate Flat tax rate of 30% on all reported income
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 – Continued from previous page
Task Description
Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, the amount in the fund is doubled, and
then redistributed on an equal per capita basis to all participants
Round 6: 50% Tax Rate Flat tax rate of 50% on all reported income
Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, the amount in the fund is doubled, and
then redistributed on an equal per capita basis to all participants
Clerical 3 Earn income that is reported in Rounds 7 through 9
Round 7: Progressive 1 Top 10% of earners in Clerical 3 pay 50% tax on reported income
Bottom 10% of earners in Clerical 3 pay 10% tax on reported income
Everyone else pays 30% tax on reported income
Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, the amount in the fund is doubled, and
then redistributed on an equal per capita basis to all participants
Round 8: Progressive 2 participants pay tax of 10% on all reported income under 50 ECU
participants pay tax of 30% on all reported income between 50 and 100 ECU
participants pay tax of 50% on all reported income over 100 ECU
Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, the amount in the fund is doubled, and
then redistributed on an equal per capita basis to all participants
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 – Continued from previous page
Task Description
Round 9: Charity Flat tax rate of 30% on all reported income
Tax revenues are collected into a common fund, the amount in the fund is doubled, and
then donated to charity
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3.5 Methods
My dependent variable is the average compliance rate across all rounds. Because it is
censored at 0% and 100%, I perform a series of Tobit analyses represented by the following
equation:
Yi = α+β1Northi +ΘXi + εi
where Y represents the percentage of earned income declared by subject i, averaged across
all nine decisions (with an upper bound at 100% and lower bound at 0%), North is a dummy
variable for Northern Italians subjects, X represents a vector of individual characteristics,
and ε represents an individual-specific error term, clustered within experimental sessions.
I am interested in how participants from Northern Italy play our games, compared to
those from the South. I therefore use a dummy variable for our respondents from the North.
Since our experiments were conducted only in the Northern regions, there is reason to ar-
gue that those participants who left the south might behave differently from southerners
who remain in the South. Feldman and Rice (1997) suggest, however, that civic culture is
usually retained from one location to the next and from generation to generation. To ex-
amine the effects of civic culture on tax compliance, I use Social Value Orientation (SVO),
which gauges how interested a person is in guaranteeing the welfare of other participants,
as a proxy for civic culture.
Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf (2011) represent SVO as a basic utility function:
U(pisel f ,piother) = pisel f +α piother (3.2)
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Figure 3.6.: Constructing the SVO Angle
From Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf (2011), Figure 2, p.773.
To measured SVO, our participants perform a series of mini-dictator games in which
they allocate decisions between themselves and a randomly selected partner. The decisions
are then assembled on coordinated plane with the x-axis displaying allocation to self and
the y-axis revealing allocation to other (see Figure 3.6, and the six blue lines corresponding
to the six items in Figure 3.7).The six allocations can then be averaged into a single angle
with a range from -16.26 to 61.40. If we were to arrange these numbers on a scale, -16.26
would represent a participant who is highly competitive, even willing to sacrifice their own
income to lessen the welfare of their partner, whereas 61.40 would represent a complete
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altruist willing to sacrifice their own income to increase the wellbeing of their partner. The
following ideal types can be drawn from the SVO angle:
• Individualists prefer to maximize their own income across the six items (−7.82◦ ≤
SVO◦ ≤ 7.82◦)1
• Prosocial people prefer to maximize joint income between themselves and the other
(37.09◦ ≤ SVO◦ ≤ 52.91◦)2
• Altruists prefer to maximize the other’s income (SVO◦ = 61.39◦)
• Competitive people prefer to maximize the relative distance between the their own
income and the other’s (SVO◦ =−16.26◦)
Most people lie somewhere in the middle as either an individualist to the left side of the
scale or prosocial to the right. Finally, I control for sex, employment status, past participa-
tion in experiments, whether the participant is an economics major, and their willingness
to accept risk.
1There is a range because the decision maker should be completely indifferent with respect to the vertical
line represented by Item 5.
2Again, the range results from the fact that the decision maker should be indifferent with respect to the
constant-sum line with -1 slope, representing Item 1.
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Figure 3.7.: SVO Mini-Dictator Games
From Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf (2011), Figure 1, p.772.
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3.6 Results
Figure 3.8.: Overall Compliance: North vs. South
Survey data only allow researchers to test the determinants of tax morale within a given
institutional environment, while tax compliance experiments enable us to control the envi-
ronment. I therefore have a good reason to believe that my results reflect actual taxpayer
behavior under an ideal, constant tax regime. Figure 3.8 illustrates the average percent of
earned income in all nine rounds by Northern and Southern participant. On the vertical
axis, I display average compliance rate with each particular round of the experiment on the
horizontal axis. At first glance it seems as if there is not a significant difference in overall
tax compliance between the North and South.
The results of my individual level Tobit models are exhibited in Table 3.6. Column I
displays the results of a bivariate analysis of the effects of living in Northern Italy on tax
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compliance. Contrary to the results found in the BI3, when respondents from the North and
South are given the same institutional environment, the model uncovers no difference in
their tax behavior.
In column II of Table 3.6, I demonstrate that SVO angle is a significant predictor of tax
compliance. Unlike the BI models where civic culture and social capital vary significantly
in the North and South, the experimental models unveil no significant divergence in SVO
between residence of North and South. Figure 3.9 shows the almost identical distributions
between North and South. When controlling for several demographic variables shown in
column III, SVO remains statistically significant. In the BI survey, we found women have
less tax morale then men, which came as a surprise. In the experiments, we find that men
are less compliant, corresponding with the vast majority of tax compliance studies. In
addition, risk acceptance is consistently significant and negative in both models.
3Filippin, Fiorio, and Viviano (2013) demonstrates the North to be positively correlated with tax morale using
the BI.
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Table 3.6: Tobit Analyses: Average Compliance
Dependent Variable: Average Compliance Rate, All Rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
North 0.00467
(0.0456)
SVO angle 0.00757*** 0.00684*** 0.00664*** 0.00734*** 0.00639***
(0.00151) (0.00140) (0.00151) (0.00147) (0.00146)
Age 0.0134* 0.0104
(0.00750) (0.00706)
Sex -0.231*** -0.199***
(0.0404) (0.0400)
Employment Status -0.116** -0.0633
(0.0513) (0.0496)
Econ Major -0.0961** -0.0599
(0.0437) (0.0420)
Past Participation -0.0772 -0.0808
(0.0553) (0.0552)
Risk Acceptance -0.0370*** -0.0243***
(0.00906) (0.00862)
Constant 0.665*** 0.550*** 0.393** 0.667*** 0.742*** 0.653***
(0.0355) (0.0322) (0.186) (0.0649) (0.0609) (0.201)
sigma
Constant 0.363*** 0.346*** 0.319*** 0.341*** 0.333*** 0.309***
(0.0159) (0.0148) (0.0153) (0.0146) (0.0154) (0.0158)
No. Uncensored Observations 275 278 276 275 268 265
No. Left Censored Observations 7 7 7 6 7 6
No. Right Censored Observations 40 40 40 40 38 38
Pseudo R2 3.44e-05 0.0955 0.246 0.113 0.175 0.297
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 3.9.: SVO Angle: North vs. South
When the state lacks the capacity to govern and redistribute goods efficiently, citizens
will often pursue other means of redistribution (i.e. clientelism). This is not to say that
southerners are less civic or culturally deficient. I demonstrate above that when the insti-
tutions are efficient, they are just as altruistic as their northern counterparts. Instead, to
receive a fairer distribution of benefits and incomes, Southern Italians must sidestep the
state.
To sum up these findings, when controlling for the institutional environment I find no
significant difference in tax compliance between the North and South challenging the often
employed moralist argument. Confirming the BI, I display that civic culture and social
capital are indeed important in shaping tax morale. In addition, the experiments tell us
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that institutions play a large role in how social capital and civic culture is materialized.
Individuals from southern Italy may be less involved in the formal organizations to which
the BI was referring, but this could largely be the result of institutional capacity, not a lack
civic conscience in the South (Sabetti 2000; Tarrow 1996). I believe that the similar SVO
angles provide further evidence to contradict the culturalist argument. In the following
chapter, I explore this argument further by examining the historical evolution of Italian
institutions and its affect on Italian tax behavior.
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4. Italy’s Complicated Past
4.1 Church, State, and Clientelism
One of the claims of this study is that civic culture and social capital do indeed shape
tax morale, but a tax behavior is formed within a specific historical and institutional en-
vironment. In the previous chapter, I proposed that more social capital and civic culture
in the North is linked to higher levels of tax morale than in the South. However, when
confronted with the same taxpayer environment, participants from the South are no differ-
ent than respondents from the North with respect to tax compliance and other-regarding
preferences (SVO). I argue that the moralist argument, which scholars often employ to
explain Italian tax behavior, fails to account for the institutional environment in which a
particular culture may manifest. By retracing the historical legacy of Italian political and
cultural institutions dating back to the Risorgimento (1815-1871) to the beginning of the
Second Republic (1994), I can closely examine the effects of periodic shifts in institutions
on behavior, specifically tax behavior. This will allow me to more convincingly establish
the contextual setting in which two divergence civic cultures and taxpayer behaviors were
formed.
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Europeans perceive Italians as the least trustworthy of Western European nations and
are Italians themselves rate other Italians as untrustworthy (Mackie 2001).1 But it seems
more likely that due to the lack of a well-functioning bureaucracy, rather than inherent qual-
ities, spurs Italians to bypass certain legal barriers. Italy consistently ranks near the bottom
on the Quality of Government index compared to other European nations and Southern
Italy ranks considerably lower than the North (see Table 4.1 and Table 4.2).
Table 4.1: Quality of Government: 14 Western European Countries
Country Quality Impartiality Corruption Average
Finland 1.657 1.296 1.266 1.406
Netherlands 0.956 1.445 0.912 1.104
Denmark 0.723 1.004 1.560 1.096
Ireland 0.705 1.046 1.252 1.001
United Kingdom 0.507 0.797 0.871 0.725
Sweden -0.030 1.128 0.897 0.665
Belgium 1.440 -0.229 0.054 0.422
Germany 0.265 0.322 0.651 0.413
Austria 0.320 0.133 0.359 0.270
Italy 0.187 0.187 -0.634 -0.087
Spain 0.083 -0.229 -0.115 -0.087
France 0.210 -0.758 0.074 -0.158
Portugal -0.259 -0.848 -0.745 -0.617
Greece -1.287 -0.655 -1.304 -1.082
Nationally-representative public opinion surveys were conducted by the Quality of
Government Institute about perceptions of local education, health and law enforcement
institutions provide the data. Researchers asked participants to rate each of the three
institutions on quality, impartiality, and corruption. For more information, see Charron,
Dijkstra, and Lapuente 2013, 2014.
1The Italian perception of one another varies across regions. See Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994:
Tabellini 2010).
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Table 4.2: Quality of Government: Italian Regions
Region Quality Region Score Rank
Trento 1.043 1.981 41
Valle d’Acosta 0.653 1.603 82
Friuli-Venezia 0.373 1.331 109
Veneto -0.186 0.788 146
Emilia-Romagna 0.217 0.757 149
Umbria -0.495 0.488 168
Toscana -0.495 0.450 170
Marche -0.535 0.448 172
Lombardia -0.542 0.442 174
Piemonte -0.652 0.335 182
Ligura -0.848 0.144 190
Abruzzo -1.097 -0.097 200
Sardegna -1.307 -0.302 204
Basilicata -1.423 -0.414 208
Lazio -1.512 -0.500 211
Sicilia -1.588 -0.575 213
Puglia -1.604 -0.590 216
Molise -1.6609 -0.645 220
Calabria -1.687 -0.671 222
Campania -2.242 -1.210 232
Nationally-representative public opinion surveys were conducted by the
Quality of Government Institute about perceptions of local education, health
and law enforcement institutions provide the data. Researchers asked partic-
ipants to rate each of the three institutions on quality, impartiality, and cor-
ruption. For more information, see (Charron, Dijkstra, and Lapuente 2013,
2014). Southern regions are in bold.
Italians, and to a greater extent, Southern Italians, live in an institutional environment
which legitimizes “furbizia”, a term meaning sly or cunningness, but which often takes on
a positive connotation. If Europeans have come to think of them as dishonest, and Italians
themselves have come to agree, this may be a byproduct of this environment. This chapter
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will consider the historical circumstances and institutions which have contributed to the
regional variation in taxpayer behavior. I cover the two most powerful institutions in Italy
– the state and the Catholic church – and their entangled web of relations which often
results in clientelistic propensities and particularistic politics.
4.2 Church vs. State
Politics and behavior in Italy are inseparable from the institutional relationship be-
tween the church and state. The Catholic church’s unique position, geographically and
historically, inescapably influences political processes and individual attitudes regarding
certain institutions. In fact, studies confirm that Italians have considerably more trust in
the Catholic church than they do in their political institutions. A poll conducted by Demos
& Pi in 2014, 2013, 2012, and 2010 that gauges trust in institutions indicates that 48% of
Italians consistently consider the church very trustworthy. The number of respondents who
say they trust the Pope very highly has stayed steady at 85% while high trust in the State
has shrunk from 21% to 19% in 2013, and 15% in 2014. Strong trust in political parties
was at 8% in 2010 and has only slipped in subsequent survey data (Rapporto Demos, Gli
Italian e Lo Stato 2014).
A unique feature of the Italian tax code further demonstrates the direct relationship be-
tween the church, state, and taxpayers. The otto per mille allows taxpayers to allocate a
portion of their tax dollars to the Catholic church, local communitarian organization, an-
other church, or the state for the purpose of providing certain social services. The fact that
82.24% of citizens utilized the otto per mille option to contribute to the Catholic church,
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vs. 13.35% of taxpayers who allocated these funds to the state, suggests the depth of their
discrimination between the two institutions (see Figure 4.1). The proximity of the Holy
See, as well as the church’s moral authority, exaggerates its role as a political actor and
an institution that constructs and legitimizes certain moral and political norms. This of-
ten conflictual relationship between the church and state in Italy has undoubtedly shaped
Italian attitudes towards the state, and in that, Italian willingness to pay taxes.
Figure 4.1.: L’otto per Mille, 1990-2014
Source: Presidenza del Consiglio dei Minsistri 2014
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1994,107) suggest the Catholic church is an antithesis
to a civic community. Their survey determines that religiosity correlates negatively with
all measures associated with civic engagement. My interview with Stafano Pisani from
the Italian Revenue Agency affirmed the continued applicability of Putnam’s statement
(1994, 107), of Italians that “[t]hey seem more concerned about the city of God than the
city of man.” Indeed, the contrast between the Italian state and Vatican City, a recognized
independent nation-state within its borders, creates a conflict between loyalty to the state
75
and devotion to the Church for Catholics. Vatican City’s connection to spirituality and
universality give it unique power above the state.
4.3 Church-state relations since the Risorgimento
The Risorgimento (Resurgence) refers to a period of political consolidation in Italy from
1815-1871, ultimately culminating in Italian unification.
For Italy’s nationalists, then, the most daunting obstacle was not the Austrian
occupation of northeastern Italy, nor the tottering Bourbon monarchy that ruled
all of the South and Sicily, nor the assorted dukes and their duchies. No, there
was a far greater power, a far more imposing foe, one that cut the peninsula in
two, blocking North from South, its capital the legendary city of Romulus and
Remus, the symbol of Italy’s ancient greatness (Kertzer 2006,2).
The founding of the nation-state system ushered in a new form of civic duty which de-
manded loyalty to the nation-state. The new European nation-state embraced political and
economic liberalism, challenging the church’s monopoly on institutional obedience. Pope
Pius IX (1864), Syllabus of Errors and Pope Leo XIII (1891), Rerum Novarum, both re-
flect the assumption that the church was the center of societal prosperity, private, and social
life. The two documents were as political as they were doctrinal. This Syllabus of Errors
presented the Vatican’s rejection of liberal democratic principles and, therefore, of a uni-
fied Italy. The book rejects the notion that the Pontiff should uphold freedom of speech,
freedom of press, and freedom of religion, and forbids Catholics from subscribing to them
(Kertzer 2006). Pope Leo XIII legitimized the avoidance of unfair taxes in the Rerum
Novarum. In his discussion of fair wages he declares XIII (1891,Article 47),
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The right to possess private property is derived from nature, not from man; and
the State has the right to control its use in the interests of the public good alone,
but by no means to absorb it altogether. The State would therefore be unjust
and cruel if under the name of taxation it were to deprive the private owner of
more than is fair.
While this clash between church and state played out throughout Europe, it was most
evident in Italy, the home of both the Holy See and unbridled political ambition. Borutta
(2012,191) says of Rerum Novarum, “Not only did it cause a culture war, but also a ‘real’
war between the nation and the papal state, and its divided society not secularist (bour-
geois, male, urban) and Catholic (clerical, female, rural) blocks.” For a half century the
greatest obstacle to a unified Italy was the Vatican, which generated tremendous rifts not
only through the Italian landscape, but also through the Italian psyche. Although temporal
power was greatly reduced, the Pope sought to assert his influence through spiritual decree.
In what was thought to be one of the most controversial aspects of his papacy Pius IX de-
clared papal infallibility and Non Expedite. Controversially at the time, Pius IX declared
himself infallible, denounced the unified state as incompatible with Catholicism, and, with
non expedite, rendered any political involvement – be it public office or voting – a sign of
support for the illegitimate state. When the Italian army finally conquered Rome in 1870,
liberals and papal supporters tore Rome apart. Borutta (2012,203) describes the situation:
“Italian patriots turned this discourse not only against Southern Italy after 1848, but also
against papal Rome.”
Regarding unification, Cardinal Giacomo Bifi said,
The fusion precipitated by two realities so distant and disparate like the area of
Lombardo-piemontese and the meridian area was a political and social drama.
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It was an administrative drama with the sudden centralization of governments
founded in antique states. But above all else, it was a spiritual and moral
drama to motivate and conclude unification which was an ideology deliberately
anticlerical (Teodori 2012,15).
Sabetti (2000) describes the chiese ricettizie, the clerical system in Southern Italy, as
much less hierarchical than the Northern clerical system. Southern dioceses had limited
resources and fewer parishes each than their Northern and Central counterparts. The North
had a centralized, clearly defined unit of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which the South did
not. The Southern ecclesial community usually consisted of a single parish priest who was
funded by the massa community (collection of landed property) (Pollard 2008). South-
ern Italians viewed the church as highly democratic, whereas, in the words of Sabetti
(2000,232) secular civil society consisted largely of “rapacious landlords, tax collectors,
conscription officers and police officials”. Southern Catholicism had a mysticism not
present in the North; New World missionaries even referred to Southern Italy as the “India
Italia” (Saunders 1998,185). Saunders (1998) describes the spirit of the South, “as a form
of practical wisdom, a fountain of energy for social transformation, a domain of autarky
and of resistance to domination, but also as ignorant superstition, debilitating fatalism and
futility, a source of social divisiveness, and anarchism.” All of this suggests an anti-statism
in the South.
The disestablishment of church lands at the time also led to the expansion of the mafia.
This mediatory class exploited lands formerly reserved to the collective for private gains
(Walston 1988). In the absence of an effective local state under the influence of the non
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expedit, non- governmental actors often fill that void; in Southern Italy both the chuch and
the mafia gained power.
Sabetti (2000,232) argues that the non expedit affected Southern civic participation less
than in the North. In the South, literacy requirements denied the franchise to 98% of the
population, and churches were often the center of organizational life. Contrary to Putnam et
al.’s claim that the Catholic church hobbled the civic community in Italy, Sabetti (2000,233)
argues that “far from negating or opposing civic involvement, the non expedite ban actually
encouraged committed Catholics to renew their grassroots efforts just at the time when
central government was bent on dissolving social civic assets from the ancien régime.” At
the same time, while Northern and Central Italy were clearly becoming increasingly anti-
clerical, the South embraced Catholicism. Later, Southern Italians embraced Catholicism
as a form of resistance against Northern dominance. Antonio Gramsci (1973,94) describes
the mezzogiorno as being
reduced to the status of a semi-colonial market, a source of savings and taxes
that was kept “disciplined” by measures of two kinds: First police measures:
pitiless preparation of every mass movement, with periodical massacres of
peasants. Second, political police measures: personal favors to the “intellec-
tual” stratum or pigliatta–in the form of jobs in the public administration.
Consistent with Gramsci’s explanation, Nick Carter (2004,11) describes the industrialized
North as exploitating the South by imposing high taxes and by offsetting the North’s large
trade deficit agains the South’s positive balance. Gramsci (1973,70-71) further argues,
[U]nity had not taken place on a basis of equality, but as hegemony of the north
over the Mezzogiorno...the north concretely was an “octopus” which enriched
itself at the expense of the south, and that its economic-industrial increment
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was in direct proportion to the impoverishment of the economy and the agri-
culture of the south.
Due to the agricultural base of the South, Italy’s taxation system hit southerners hard, while
the North benefited the most from public spending (Carter 2004). However, Carter (2004)
argues evidence does not support claims of exploitation and high taxation. Nonetheless,
Clark (1996) notes the state imposed an unprecedented tax burden in the South at the time
of unification which funded the development of the North. For example, between 1862
and 1897, 455 million lire were spent on landfills in Northern and Central Italy, while only
three million was spent on such resources in the South. The majority of school and railway
spending was also concentrated in the North. The North was politically dominant, which
meant it was also the decision-maker with regards to tax revenue (Clark 1996,24-25).
Even if the claims of exploitation were exaggerated, unification certainly had a negative
effect on development in the South. Graph 4.2 illustrates Southern per capita GDP as of per
of the Northern per capita GDP since the Risorgimento and a rapid decline in the South.
If exploitation was a legitimate concern of Southern residents post-Risorgimento, they nat-
urally would embrace the Church and the mafia as a form of protection. The disturbing
state of local government affairs also alienated the populace from the official government.
In many cities, the mayor, who was also the largest landowner, provided jobs to his allies
and his friends decided who paid taxes. Tax riots in which locals burned down government
buildings holding tax records were common (Clark 1996).
Unification posed a distinct threat to the church. State land reclamation and the disillu-
sionment of ecclesiastical corporations largely destroyed the church’s political and social
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Figure 4.2.: GDP per capita in the Mezzogiorno as a Percent of Northern GDP per Capita
Source: Bianchi, Miotti, Padovani, and Pellegrini 2011
Redline represents unification.
foundation. The church’s influence remained strong, however. As Bakunin states in Mana-
corda (1975,119-120),
Your peasants are superstitious, but not at all religious. They love the Church
because she is very dramatic and interrupts, with her theatrical and musical
ceremonies, the monotony of country life. The Church for them a ray of light
in a life of hardship, backbreaking toil, grief, and poverty.
Another consequence of the disestablishment of church lands was the exploitation of the
collective for private gains, which then led to a large expansion of a mediatory class known
as the mafia (Walston 1988). When there is an absence of an effective state, a power vacuum
is left behind in which non-governmental actors (i.e. the Mafia and the church) often fill
that void, leading to highly corrupt (low-trust) societies (Levi 1996).
If the taxation system was exploitative, they naturally seek ways to avoid paying taxes
they saw as illegitimate (Carter 2004). When the state lacks the capacity to govern and
redistribute goods efficiently, citizens will often pursue other means of redistribution (i.e.
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clientelism) (Bergman 2009; Fargion 1997; Hopkin and Mastropaolo 2009; Rothstein 2011).
By contrast, citizens are more likely to pay taxes if they believe the state will spend the
money efficiently (Cummings et al. 2009; Edlund 1999; Frey and Torgler 2007; Frey and
Feld 2002; Levi 1989; Pommerehne, Hart, and Frey 1994; Scholz and Lubell 1998; Smith
1992; Smith and Stalans 1991; Torgler and Schneider 2007b).
4.4 The Partito Popolare Italiano, The Partito Socialista Italiano, and the Rise of
Fascism
The Italian government purged the majority of the associations with Catholicism in
1898, but rising fears of Socialism made Catholics and right-wing liberals strange bedfel-
lows. Although a Catholic political-economic movement flickered in the South, it never
recovered from earlier losses. Pope Pius X began rolling back the progress of the Catholic
workers’ movement and effectively outlawed the Christian Democrats in 1903 (Pollard
2008). As Saunders (1998,188) writes, the political dimensions of Catholicism remained a
“fragmentary, disorganized, and contradictory set of beliefs and practices” that only con-
nected with the church hierarchy “in a sporadic and partial way”. Southern Catholics re-
acted by having little to do with the workers’ movement and organizational life. However,
Italian organizational life thrived in the North during the reign of Prime Minister Giovanni
Giolitti. Pollard (2008,64-65) notes that,
(Saunders 1998,188).
Lombardy was the geographical stronghold of Catholic labour, with 62.5 per-
cent of the membership of agricultural unions and 43 percent of the agricul-
tural ones: 55 percent of the total membership of all Catholic unions. Apart
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from Lombardy, the only other region with a significant proportion of Catholic
unionized labour was Venetia with 18.3 percent of total membership, and worth
of Rome, support for Catholic unions was exiguous.
This is significant because it suggests that, while Putnam describes a long history of as-
sociational behavior (civic-ness) in the Catholic church dating back to the republican gov-
ernments of the middle-ages, in fact the Catholic church made a conscious effort to build
associations as an alternative to a Socialist workers movement. The Catholic church, thus,
played an important role shaping a virtuous civic culture in Northern Italy in the years im-
mediately proceeding World War I; this did not materialize in Southern Italy. Meanwhile,
the central regions of Italy, Emilia-Romagna, Marche, Umbria, and Tuscany, remained a
Socialist stronghold. On the one hand, intense political competition between the Catholics
and the Socialist for the support of both laborers and peasants drove Northern and Central
Italian civic-ness and institutional superiority. On the other hand, the lack of any real po-
litical competition in the South inhibited the formation of efficient public institutions, and
hence, a civic oriented populace. Tarrow (1967,168-169) states that clientele groups domi-
nated Southern Italian politics at the time of unification, “but so ingrained was the clientele
system that the mass of new voters, most of them rural and all of them dependent econom-
ically on the political elite, were easily integrated into the existing system.” Therefore not
only was political competition lacking, but poor Southern peasants were dependent on their
clientelistic relationships with local elites.
The rise of a Catholic political party, Partitio Popolare Italiano (PPI), marked the begin-
ning of Catholic mainstreaming in Italian politics. Because the South almost completely
dismantled organized Catholicism, the PPI’s support came mainly from the Northern re-
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gions of Italy (see Section 4.3). Pope Pius X died three weeks after the outbreak of
World War I and was succeeded by Pope Benedict XV. An immediate reversal of the anti-
modernization policies of his predecessor followed, and with that came an improved rela-
tionship with the Italian government and the Italian people. While anti-Italian stigma had
been attached to the Catholic church since the Risorgimento, Italian-Catholic politicians
and the patriotism of the Catholic clergy during the war changed the prevailing feelings
about Catholicism in Europe (Pollard 2008). Furthermore, the war bitterly divided the old
ruling-class paving the way for outside parties such as the PPI and the Socialist (PSI). The
election of 1919 was disastrous for the ruling elite. More than half (53%) of the seats in
the chamber went to the PPI and the Socialist with only 91 seats going to Giolitti’s party.
Only in the South did the “old government” parties win more than half the votes, which
was largely the result of a practiced called transformismo in which ruling parties win over
the opposition in return for political, and often, financial favors. The liberals, especially
in the South, made use of public resources for both individual and political gain (Walston
1988,49).
The North and South were divided across party lines; 146 of 156 of the Socialist
deputies came from the North and Center; 76 of the 100 PPI deputies were also from
the North; and 162 of the 239 liberals and radicals (old government) were elected in the
South. When elections were called in 1921, the Giolitti (Prime Minister) government’s
hegemony rested on shaky ground. He therefore had to make certain concessions to the
Fascists, including adding them to the government’s party list. The disparate governing
coalition Giolitti put together was doomed from the outset, which resulted in his immedi-
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ate resignation, to be followed by a string of short-lived prime ministers and the eventual
rise of Benito Mussolini.
The strongest push for Fascism did not come from Northern Nationalist regions like
Trieste, but rather from the landlords and leaseholders of the traditionally Socialist regions
of Emila-Romagna and Tuscany. By 1921, the fasci (individual groups which would later
form the fascist party) had already made considerable headway as a grassroots movement
in the traditional red zones of central Italy and the North. Squadrismo, a form of polit-
ical intimidation, proved to be an important tactic in the purging of local unionists and
Socialist. Encouraged by the promise of jobs and land, local peasants later joined the Fas-
cists squadrismo in transforming the zone rossa from a Socialist stronghold into a Fascist
mainstay (Clark 1996,216-217).
In late 1921, Mussolini turned the squadristi factions into an entire mass political move-
ment (Partito Nazionale Fascista, PNF ) with over 300,000 members by 1922 and a “re-
spectable” base of politicians. They were no longer a ragtag group of peasants, landlords,
and leaseholders; instead they encompassed a wide-range of working-class and middle-
class Italians, largely in the North, especially those disappointed by the Catholics and the
Socialists and a large number of students. Syndicalism became a significant facet of the
Fascist movement as the Catholic and Socialist unions diminished. Considerable oppo-
sition met Mussolini’s campaign against the syndicalists in Puglia (Sabetti 2000). Clark
(1996,218) notes that, “the union, or syndicate, linked the old radical aspirations to the new
reactionary reality; or rather, it showed that Fascism was not merely a reaction.” Further he
writes, “It was literally true, in 1920-21, the Fascists made the trains run on time, indeed
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run at all.” Many people believed Mussolini’s Fascists were Italy’s savior. The combina-
tion of militant action in Rome and Milan and the pursuit of compromise with politicians
boosted morale. To avert a civil war, the king invited Mussolini to form the new govern-
ment on October 28, 1922, and by 1925, Mussolini had completely consolidated political
power.
The Fascists offered the Vatican preferential tax treatment, support for religious educa-
tion, and a rise of stipends for priests, which won the church’s support, and with it that of
much of the population. Mussolini used this political capital to suppress those Catholics
who opposed him, which caused a large decline in the Catholic labour movement, an ideal
outcome for both the Vatican and the state (Pollard 2008). Secret negotiations between
Pope Pius and Mussolini took place between 1926 and 1929 that culminated in the Lateran
Treaty, which provided for the establishment of Vatican City as a sovereign, independent
state. The Financial Convention compensated the Church for substantial losses, and the
Concordat opened the door to new relations between the Church and state and the rebuild-
ing of Catholicism in Italian society (Pollard 2008). Even as church-state relations ame-
liorated and the state drastically expanded, tax evasion remained high. It did decline, but
development remained substantially in the North (see Figure 4.3 and refer back to Figure
4.2).
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Figure 4.3.: Evasion of Total Inheritance Taxes, 1909-1939
Source: Gini 1962
Redline marks the beginning of the Mussolini government.
4.5 The Fascist Period
Contrary to punctuated equilibrium theory in which major shifts punctuate long peri-
ods of equilibrium, disparities between Northern and Southern Italy developed in a more
continual fashion. Tax reforms introduced by Mussolini’s finance minister, Alberto De Ste-
fani, in the early Fascist period (1922-25) provided preferential tax treatment to productive
industries with the misguided expectation that these industries would react gratuitously by
complying with existing tax law. Mussolini reacted to this error with a shift from liberal
tax policies to an authoritarian model. He declared tax evaders “the worst parasites in the
nation” and increased tax enforcement between 1926 and 1929 (Manestra 2010,29). He in-
troduced tax verification agents and criminalized tax evasion. However, increased foreign
87
commitments in the 1930s led him to restrain the more authoritarian aspects of the admin-
istration’s tax policy. A more cooperative model between taxpayers and the government,
especially with respect to businesses, began to prevail.
Other changes, such as Mussolini’s industrial policy, further accentuated economic di-
visions between the North and the South. Economic development throughout the Fascist
period was concentrated in engineering, steelmaking, chemicals, and hydro-electricity sup-
ply – all industries located in the industrial triangle of the North-West. Almost half of
industrial workers and two-thirds of engineers worked in Lombardy, Liguria, and Pied-
mont, and the majority of workers from the South were farmers and artisans (Clark 1996).
This means that more Southern Italians are self-employed, and consequently responsible
for paying their taxes instead of having them deducted from wages. Self-employment also
makes it easier to evade taxes by dealing in cash. As shown in Figure 4.4, the percent of
self-employed individuals is higher in the Southern regions than the North.
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Figure 4.4.: Self-Employed by Region, 2009 (percentage of total employees)
Source: ISTAT 2010
The state also increased the extent of the welfare state in the Fascist period, making
Northern industrial workers eligible for generous benefits not available to Southern workers
– an imbalance that continues to this day. This has supported patronage and clientelistic
practices as a means of income supplementation in the South, and many Southern Italians
have sold their votes for public employment and favorable tax treatment (Ferrera 1996a).
Fascism was a Northern movement, and the state generally neglected the South. Energy
prices in the South were double those in the North and inflation wiped out the financial se-
curity of a significant number of Southerners. When the United States began drastically
cutting back on immigration in the 1920s (from 233,000 per year 1901- 1910 to 11,500
in 1930), the North became the center of Southern migration, resulting in an extraordinary
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drain of human capital in the South (Clark 1996). Mussolini made concessions to landown-
ers and lawyers in the South funneling jobs through parastato, quasi-governmental agen-
cies which dealt with health, welfare, and pensions. This then became the most important
criteria for the distribution of resources (Clark 1996; Walston 1988).
Although we have no available data on overall tax compliance between Northern and
Southern Italy in the Fascist period, a drop in the evasion of inheritance taxes coincided
Mussolini’s consolidation of power in 1926 and his tax reforms (see Figure 4.3). This
suggests that administrative capacity and wherewithal can be an effective tool for tax en-
forcement. While the Fascist period intensified distinctions between the North and South
and therefore probably increased evasion in the South, Mussolini also instituted several
policies that remain in the tax code today such as progressive and deductive taxation.2
4.6 The First Republic to The Second Republic
During World War II, Italy’s major political parties organized anti-fascist “partisans” or
bands of rebels that organized a mass propaganda machine, encouraged strikes, and cam-
paigned for higher wages in the North (Clark 1996,313). The Communists (PCI) led the
largest resistance group, the Garibaldi Brigade. The other resistance groups, in order of
size, were the Party of Action, the Christian Democrats (Green Flames) (DC), the Social-
ists, and the Liberals. By 1944, one umbrella organization known as the Committee of
National Liberation for Upper Italy (CLNAI) consolidated this opposition, and this became
the seeds of the provisional government Clark (1996,315).
2Deductive taxation refers to policy allowing the tax authorities to tax citizens not only on the basis of their
income, but also on their standing of living.
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The PCI reaped the majority of the political benefits of the resistance, which were
concentrated in the North. The South was almost entirely excluded from the movement,
and leftist parties in the North could not penetrate the existing regional political structures
(Clark 1996,316). Northern Italians celebrated resistance and anti-fascism post-World War
II, and political participation was high, but the South remained untouched (Duggan 2008).
In the 1944-46 period, Sicilian farmers organized to secede from the North, which led to a
June 2, 1946 popular vote pitting the Italian dynasty against the Republic. The North, led by
the communists, socialists, and Christian Democrats, favored the Republic; the majority of
the South voted to uphold the Dynasty (Duggan 2008; Gilmour 2011). Southern opposition
continued to divide the region ideologically from the North, and in 1946 tensions between
the PCI and the Christian Democrats presented another challenge to national unity. While
the PCI was closely tied to the Soviets, the aid and investment of the U.S. government and
U.S. firms influenced the Christian Democrats and the De Gasperi government. American
aid and jobs also won support in the South.
Under pressure from the Vatican and the South, the 1947 De Gasperi coalition excluded
the Communists and Socialists. The 1947 Italian Constitution, however, showed remark-
able levels of compromise between the parties. Article 53, for example, states, “all shall
contribute to public expenditure in accordance with their means. The system of taxation
shall be based on the criteria of progression.” Article 20 states “no special legislative limi-
tation or tax burden may be imposed on the establishment, legal capacity or activities of any
association or institution on the ground of its ecclesiastical nature or its religious or worship
purposes” (La Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana 1947). With the elections growing
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closer, the Americans and the Vatican ramped up support for the Christian Democrats and
threatened to excommunicate supporters of other parties. In the end, the South rallied to
the Church and the Christian Democrats; the center (zona rossa) remained in the hands of
the PCI, and the North turned to the Christian Democrats (Clark 1996).
The new Republic implemented broad tax reform (Legge Vanoni) on January 11, 1951
under the control of Finance Minister Enzio Vanoni. The law had four major provisions:
1) taxpayers – both employees and self-employed – had to fill out annual tax returns; 2)
greater progressivity combined with lower income taxes overall; 3) a series of consump-
tion taxes; and 4) business taxes on items such as stamps and licensing (Amrosetti 2004).
Unfortunately, Vanoni lacked the administrative capacity to implement the major features
of the reform, and tax compliance remained low. The new tax code was particularly sus-
ceptible to particularism, and high income earners as well as specific DC voting blocs in
the South took advantage. Specific voting blocks became linked to particularistic benefits,
which made it very difficult to sever ties between the patron and client.
The Christian Democrats, which ruled for the majority of the post-war era, developed
an enormous political machine that furthered separated the South from Rome. The Chris-
tian Democrats implemented a land reform policy in Southern Italy from which only a
select few supporters actually benefited, increasing the clientelistic network in the South.
Huge public works projects, costing the state billons of lire, were funneled directly into the
pockets of well-connected entrepreneurs, many of whom had extensive mafia ties (Duggan
2008; Gilmour 2011).
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The 1950s marked the beginning of approximately two decades of great prosperity in
northern Italy. As it became one of the most industrious regions in Europe, greatly benefit-
ing from the European Community, the Marshall Plan loans, and an influx of cheap south-
ern labor, the South remained impoverished. Data provided by Clark (1996,357) depicts
southern Italy as similar to many underdeveloped countries, but much larger in population
and territory than most. In 1951, for example, income per head was 90 lire per day (half
of that in the North) and unemployment was approximately 50%. The disparities between
the North and the South were so considerable the state instituted three broad infrastructure-
focused state intervention plans, known as the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, National Hy-
drocarbons Agency (ENI), and the Agrarian Reform, which agencies administered from
Rome.
Established in 1950, the Cassa’s original strategy related primarily to agricultural pro-
duction, but by 1957 it had transformed to favor the relatively capital-intensive private
and public firms in the steel, chemical, and petrochemicals industries. Consequently, it
increased unemployment among Southerners by shifting investment from the agricultural
periphery to the urban coastlands and importing high-skill workers from the North to the
South (Chubb 1982). Although Amintore Fanfani, De Gasperi’s successor, hoped to re-
place the clientele system with a new form of organized politics in the South, none of the
state intervention plans disrupted firmly embedded clientelism (Tarrow 1967).
According to (Chubb 1982,32), the Cassa which was “concieved as a special stream-
lined instrument to channel state funds into carefully chosen development projects” but it
“was soon transformed into a political bandwagon for the maintenance of local clienteles.”
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Tarrow (1967,313) disparages both Cassa and ENI, calling them both, “far from revolu-
tionary... mainly a program of mass patronage, which could gather votes for the party from
all groups and shades of opinion in the South.” In Calabria, from 1940 to 1976, all the
directors of the Cassa’s main office were Christian Democrats (Warner 2009). According
to Duggan, these bureaucrats considered the public sector as a tool to garner partisan polit-
ical support, instead of a means to develop the South or to foster what he calls an “ethical
model of citizenship” (Duggan 2008,562-63).
Mario Caciagli (2006) argues that clientelism is a cultural phenomena and a unique
form of political culture, and that a specific cultural code based on reciprocity and def-
erence defines it. The typical resilience and path dependency of institutions contributed
to the tenacity of clientelism in the southern Italian political system.3 Steinmo (2010,16)
argues that “any institutional arrangement is part of an adaptive process in which multiple
agents operate within a dynamic context.” Applying this to clientelism in Southern Italy
explains the adaption of the DC to clientelistic pressures. At the same time, a system sup-
ported by notables supported the clientelistic system (Patronage System)4 and a type of
clientelism that directly utilized public resources in exchange for votes (Caciagli 2006).
Caciagli (2006) explains, “in the conditions of the South, clientelism remained the princi-
ple factor in inhibiting a culture of social cooperation and collective action” in the south.
Clientelism secures lasting political power, but fails to building a civic consciousness or an
active civil society.
3See Pierson 2000; Steinmo 2008 in Chapter 2 Section 2.1
4See Warner 2009,129
94
Data from Warner (2009,130) demonstrates a telling story about clientelism in the
South. In the early 1950s, the South accounted for 45% of all public employees, but only
38% of the population. This number increased to 63% of bureaucrats by 1963, overwhelm-
ingly driven by clientelistic practices between the DC and important interest groups.5 The
Catholic Church’s “Catholic Action”, which was integral to the DC’s dominance, often
determined who became civil servants and who occupied government ministries. Warner
(2009,141) writes, “the DC’s clientelist system grew not so much from staffing the pub-
lic bureaucracies under its control, but from distributing the financial largesse of which
the state agencies were in possession, and from bureaucratic problem-solving on behalf of
individual constituents.”
Clientelism is not a homogenous phenomena, rather it acclimates to a specific political
and economic environment. On the one hand, in the South, where resources were extremely
scarce and interest groups were not visible, the DC dealt with individual constituents by
promising universal benefits and resource distribution. In the North, where interest groups,
such as Catholic Action, were firmly rooted in the political ecosystem, the DC had to appeal
to local leaders with specific benefits usually in the form of public works. In fact, Tarrow
(1996) contends that it was the progressive politics in the North, such as the DC, PCI, and
Catholic Action, which guaranteed “defense of democracy and of social development”6 that
deliberately established civic associations, and with that, good governance. In the South,
hierarchical links were more common, while in the North, the state and civil society were
more involved.
5Data was calculated from Saraceno 1972,102, table 1.
6See Warner 2009,142
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Patrons can represent their clients through the distribution of tax favors or by their
willingness to turn a blind eye to tax evasion (Duggan 2008). According to Hopkin and
Mastropaolo (2009,153),
[T]hese clientelistic networks were able to show the benevolent face of the
state, which not only made few demands on citizens, but could even help re-
solve their private difficulties. As far as the less benevolent face – taxation, mil-
itary service, bureaucratic inefficiency – was concerned, the state’s deference
toward local notables allowed them to offer their clients help and protection.
I mentioned above that when the state lacks the capacity to govern and redistribute goods
efficiently, citizens will often pursue other means of redistribution, including clientelism.
(Bergman 2009; Fargion 1997; Hopkin and Mastropaolo 2009; Rothstein 2011). By con-
trast, citizens are more likely to pay taxes if they believe their tax money is being spent
efficiently (Cummings et al. 2009; Edlund 1999; Frey and Torgler 2007; Frey and Feld
2002; Levi 1989; Pommerehne, Hart, and Frey 1994; Scholz and Lubell 1998; Smith 1992;
Smith and Stalans 1991; Torgler and Schneider 2007b).7 In the South, where the govern-
ment was both inefficient and taxation was relatively high, clientelism was a vehicle to
sidestep the inefficiencies of the state and avoid high taxation. The DC’s clientelistic polit-
ical strategy, guaraenteed its national political dominance for nearly 40 years. Even in the
most Northern areas – where the PCI maintained a great deal of strength – the DC’s use of
clientelistic politics in the form of business regulations and lax tax enforcement, broadened
the support for the DC (Hopkin and Mastropaolo 2009).
When the governing coalition incorporated the Socialists (PSI) in the 1960s, the Italian
welfare system moved in an ambitious and progressive direction. Between the mid-1950s
7See Section 4.3
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to the beginning of the 1970s welfare appears as the largest facet of central government
expenditures reaching 38% by the mid-1970s (Ferrera 1986). Welfare spending became a
tool by which patrons could redistribute public goods through the welfare state to a vast
network of clients. Between 1951 and 1976, the portion of the labor force employed by the
state doubled to 22% of the labor force, which is both a sign of Italy’s bureaucratization and
clientelism (Ferrera 1986,395). We can also examine the distribution of public employment
by party identification to better understand the extent of clientelism in the welfare system;
Table 4.3 clearly exposes the mass patronage system favored by the DC.
Table 4.3: The Distribution of Executive Board Positions by Party, 1945-1975
Parties 1945-47 1948-54 1955-62 1963-69 1970-75 Total
DC 25.1 31.5 35.7 38.0 38.5 26.3
PCI 8.7 5.3 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.3
PSDI 6.4 6.5 7.1 5.3 4.7 45.8
PSI 5.9 4.3 4.2 5.4 8.4 5.6
PLI 5.0 7.2 4.1 3.5 2.3 4.0
MSI 0.5 1.6 2.1 2.5 1.7 2.0
Not Identified 47.5 40.1 39.3 37.6 37.0 38.5
(N) (219) (2,019) (3,822) (4,028) (3,453) (13,541)
Source: Ferrera 1986,448 *Not identified refers to officials with no party affiliation or
unknown party affiliation.
Italy’s welfare system is a two-tiered system characterized by a highly protected class of
worker – mainly public employees and industrial workers – and those in non-traditional and
grey or black market jobs. Considering the large regional discrepancies in employment, the
two-tiered welfare system significantly benefits northern workers more than their southern
counterparts (See Figure 4.5). Southerners supplement their insufficient incomes through
subverting the rules and regulations of the welfare system as well as by evading taxes, and
public administrators tolerate and even encourage them (Ferrera 1996).
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Figure 4.5.: Differences in Irregular Employment by Region
Source: Chiarini and Marzano (2007)
One study of Italian firms by Regonini (1984,106) revealed that 42% of the employees
of more than 10,000 firms studied evaded their social security payments. The failure to
enforce tax laws eroded the support of universalism by labor. Labor rightly assumed that
they would bear the brunt of the financial obligations in the form of increased payroll
taxes, and clientelism favored a particularlistic system instead a universalistic welfare state
(Lynch 2010). Unions thus proposed to make evasion of social security taxes a criminal
offense (abandoned by Mussolini), but the DC defeated the measure. In the absence of such
a measure, both the welfare state and the tax system in Italy are products of particularistic
politics and clientelism the leading political parties pursued after WWII.
Although the relative gap between the North and the South remained as wide as ever,
a massive injection of state spending and welfare (education and healthcare) significantly
increased the living standards of the average southern Italian individual in the early 1960s.
However, by 1967 the Italian economy was showing signs of crisis. A large migration of
98
unskilled southern workers successfully supplanted high-skill factory workers in the North,
which led to major factory floor protests throughout Northern Italy. Subsequently, Southern
factory workers took to the shop floor to demand better pensions, social security, housing,
and health services. By 1976, the trade union movement became a major force in Italian
politics encompassing nearly 50% of workers (Clark 1996,377). Large pay-raises, how-
ever, exponentially increased overall labor costs in Italy, causing a considerable downturn
amongst Italian firms. With labor costs exceeding those Briton and German firms experi-
enced by 39%, profits greatly tapered by the end of the decade. Both the extreme right and
left responded to the crisis with political terrorism, including assassinations and kidnap-
pings. Italy was ripe for a long-term solution to the political turmoil.
Two decades after regional governments had been enshrined into the constitution, the
state introduced regional governments in the Spring of 1970. By the mid-1970s, Ital-
ian regions could provide subsidies, fund and staff welfare agencies, draw up regional
development plans, and organize their own cooperatives. However, as Clark (1996,392)
writes, these regional governments fed the Calabrian Mafia (ndrangheta) and the Neopoli-
tan camorra, with local baronies supporting particularism, rather than creating more effi-
cient, democratic institutions. “There may,” he notes, “have been little popular enthusi-
asm for the regions, but many of the organized interests-groups thought they were splen-
did”(Clark 1996,392).
After the introduction of the regional governments in 1970, important legislation was
introduced to shake up the tax system. Tax reform in 1973, which the Minister of Finance,
Luigi Preti, introduced, forced Italy to construct a more modern tax system to match the
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demands of a developed nation. It further had to complement a burgeoning public deficit
and a far more uncertain situation than the preceding decade. This included the establish-
ment of a variety of new taxes such as the IRPEF (national progressive income tax), IRPEG
(corporate income tax, replaced by IRES), ILOR (local income tax), INVIM (capital gains
tax), and a VAT (Value Added Tax).
The state even attempted to revert to the more authoritarian – tough sanctions and
stigmatization – measures Mussolini had used to enforce tax compliance. Provincial news-
papers throughout Italy published the names of famous people who had evaded their taxes
as well as 200,000 tax evaders between 1979 and 1981. Law 516/1982, the so-called
manette agli evasori (handcuffs for evaders), designated a number of tax behaviors as re-
vealing an attempt to evade taxes, making them serious criminal offenses with elevated
penalties. Prior to manette agli evasori, a judge could not indict an offender before there
was undeniable proof of evasion (Santoro 2010). However, behavior remained resistant to
these changes. The courts found many of the provisions of, manette agli evasori unconsti-
tutional, and only a small fraction of accused transgressors were convicted under the law
(Santoro 2010,Kindle Locations 951-952). The less punitive Law 154/1991 and 74/2000
replaced manette agli evasori. Examining Table 4.4, we can observe that evasion actually
increased from the time of the implementation of the tax reform through 1978, decreasing
slightly 1978-1980, but never falling falls below 33.7% in this period.
The level of evasion during this period, coupled with continuous attempts to fix the tax
system, suggests that the tax administration was defenseless in the fight against evasion.
A patronage system immersed in the political culture of both northern and southern Italy
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Table 4.4: IRPEF Evasion + Erosion 1975-1987
Year Visco (1994a) Visco (1984b) Vitaletti (1984) Bernardi (1989) Visco (1992)
1975 33.7
1976 39.0
1977 42.0 42.0
1978 41.8 42.0
1979 38.9 37.7 43.2
1980 37.0 42.5
1981 39.7
1982
1983
1984 56.6
1985
1986
1987 46.7
Source: Bernardi 1989; Visco 1984a,b, 1992; Vitaletti 1984
ultimately produced tax evasion. But in the North, clientelism materialized as legitimate
public works projects, while in the south, the provision of welfare benefits, public sector
jobs, and tax favors characterized it. The South had been greatly damaged by organized
crime, and youth unemployment was just barely under 50%. While Duggan (2008,575)
notes, that the trappings of modern consumerism had come to the South, he credits cash
transfers through the social security system and “superfluous public sector jobs” for that
prosperity that existed in the region. In the North, on the other hand, the 1980s was a time
of great prosperity. Commentators have called the region success “the second economic
miracle”. Manufacturing and artisan production was booming, largely due to the state’s
willingness to overlook tax crimes and an exceptionally corrupt political system.
The 1980s turned out to be the beginning of a series of corruption scandals that would
eventually bring down Italy’s national government, leading to the so-called “Second Re-
public” and the prominence of Silvio Berlusconi. The largest corruption case, Tangentopoli
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(Bribesville), exposed a number of high ranking public officials (half of parliament) for acts
of bribery. Contrary to Putnam et al.’s theory of Northern (1994) civic supremacy, the most
notorious corruption scandals were born in the North. Tarrow (1996), in fact, denotes this
as one of Making Democracy Work’s greatest shortcomings. How could a region that is
clearly civically endowed be the center of such large-scale corruption scandals?
This flaw in Putnam et al.’s theory of tax evasion in the South leads back to the com-
plexities this chapter has sought to address in terms of tax evasion, compliance, and morale.
By constructing a historical landscape dating back to the Risorgimento through the fall of
the First Republic, I have identified several influential periods which, in theory, should
have resulted in punctuations to Italian taxpayer behavior. The Risorgimento clearly had
significant repercussions for church-state relations, and in that, defined two different pat-
terns of taxpayer behavior. I argued that pro-state liberals in the North would be much
more inclined to contribute to the state coffers, compared to the pro-church Catholics in the
South. I then turned to the advent of Fascism, especially in the North. Although institu-
tions including the tax system experienced a major shock, the divisions between North and
South only increased. After the fall of Fascism and the end of WWII, the rise of mass po-
litical parties, and with that, clientelism, altered the political and economic landscape, but
exacerbated the gap between the North and South. Political competition and progressive
politics had the effect of shaping functioning public institutions (albeit through clientelism)
and a responsible citizenry in the North, whereas the DC’s political monopoly in the South
eventuated in a form of clientelism that provided public employment to unqualified work-
ers and tax favors to local businessmen. Then, a series of tax reforms in the 1970s and
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strict penalization of tax evaders did little to combat the deep rooted issues in the Italian tax
system. Finally, a series of major corruption scandals originating in the North in the 1980s
and 1990s shed light on some of the underlying issues; they further illuminated the fact that
corruption is not unique to southern Italy and is not necessarily the product of a backwards
culture. Ultimately, this chapter concludes that institutions (i.e. church, political parties,
and clientelism), just as much as culture, shape tax behavior, as Chapter 3 and Chapter 4
suggest.
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5. A Nation Divided?
Taxes are the price we pay for civilization. Taxes pay for our schools, our roads, our
security, and our government. They also pay for goods and services for which there is not
necessarily public consensus. What contributes to citizens complying with tax policy is a
question that social scientists have been pondering for many years. Sandmo and Alling-
ham were innovators in the field. They were the first to address the question of why citizens
comply or evade. For them, evasion was a matter of utility maximization. If the probability
of sanctions and the severity of the penalty were low enough that evasion would maximize
a taxpayer’s utility, then the taxpayer would be expected to evade. Although pioneering,
this approach is not free of criticism. The vast majority of taxpayers are honest. Expla-
nations outside of the economics of crime approach, which consider sociodemographic
considerations and cultural variables, examine an individual’s intrinsic motivation to pay
taxes. These studies have revealed a great deal more about tax morale, tax compliance, and
tax evasion. Yet, despite the vast number of studies on compliance and evasion, little re-
search has thoroughly analyzed the institutional environment in which a taxpayer behavior
is construed. Italy’s regional dualism, historical complexities, and cultural variation pro-
vide researchers an ideal case from which to extrapolate why we do or do not pay taxes.
Does rational choice alone explain willingness to pay taxes? Do underlying cultural dif-
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ferences explain the regional variation? Or have institutions shaped economic outcomes?
These are all important questions which have both empirical and practical consequences.
Estimates suggest that around 26% of income taxes are evaded, with considerable dis-
parities registered among different types of workers in Italy: Self-employed individuals
and entrepreneurs evade approximately 60% of their income taxes, while employees only
evade approximately 10%, strongly implying there are important structural aspects of eva-
sion. Whereas taxes are withdrawn automatically from the paychecks of employees, taxes
are left to the discretion of the self-employed. By simply exchanging cash and not issu-
ing receipts the self-employed can easily evade taxes. The self-employed make up a much
larger percentage of the economy in the South than in the North which is a reasonable ex-
planation for some of the differences. The regional variation is just as telling, but it requires
a multitude of explanations. IRAP evasion (regional production tax) moves from 13%-50%
in northern Italy, while in the south the lowest rate is 54%, while Calabria loses the most at
94% taxable income.
Edward Banfield and Robert Putnam have written influential books suggesting that
Southern citizens’ only immediate concern is to the familial unit, which in turn, has weak-
ened governmental efficiency and economic development. Theoretically, strong inward-
facing ties suffocate a sense of responsibility, reciprocity, and trust in those persons not
within the immediate family or closely linked to them, greatly increasing transaction costs.
This can also lead to more individualistic behaviors and an adversarial relationship with the
state. According to this logic, paying taxes increases the utility of the state by decreasing
the utility of the family unit. On the other hand, weak outward-facing ties, actually increase
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an individual’s sense of duty to others and cuts down on transaction costs through an esca-
lated feeling of reciprocity and trust in others. A taxpayer can then increase his utility by
paying taxes, because tax dollars are redistributed through the state to increase the utility
of others. The culturalist would suggest that culture shapes taxpayer behaviors, explaining
much of the variation between the North and the South.
Institutionalists argue that it is the institutions, both formal and informal, that guide
economic outcomes and even cultural experience. They imply that the cuturalists ignore
the institutional setting in which behaviors are formed. What institutions were present that
resulted in dishonest taxpayers in the South? Beginning with the formation of Italy, the two
regions went down two divergent political and institutional paths shaping how well those
governments govern, and importantly, how its citizens perceive the state. The quality of
the institutions to which our tax money is paid encourages honest or dishonest taxpayers.
Although the United States is not central to the present study, my most recent experimental
evidence indicates that when taxpayers in Italy and the U.S. are compelled to pay into a
pool that will be given to the national government, taxpayers in the U.S. comply 17% more
than their Italian cohorts (See Figure 5.1). Perceptions regarding the quality of government
are significant and institutions do matter.
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Figure 5.1.: Average Compliance: Italy vs. U.S.
Although each of these frameworks has been promoted to explain why Northern Italy is
different from the South, and more specifically, why tax compliance differs, they are typi-
cally employed as contradictory explanations rather than compatible. This study’s compar-
ative analysis – institutional and individual – of taxpayer behavior in Italy revealed complex
relationships between structure, culture, and institutions. It is thus implausible to consider
one framework without the other. Just as institutions shape culture, culture can have pro-
found effects on how institutions are governed. As discussed throughout the paper, civic
virtue and social capital have a positive effect on tax morale, and northern Italy is endowed
with higher levels of both. I have also suggested through historical analysis that certain
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institutions actively promoted the development of different forms of civic participation and
engagement in North, while neglecting the South. Below is a summary of these findings,
followed by a discussion of possible policy implications and avenues for further research.
The object of this research was to re-examine the long-studied question of what explains
regional disparities in Italian tax morale and compliance. I proposed four main independent
variables that significantly shape tax morale and compliance. I first exploited the culturalist
argument using civic culture and social capital to explain regional variance in taxpayer
behavior. Briefly, I also examined the effects of being self-employed on tax morale. In
contrast to most conventional assumptions, I generated a final hypothesis that considers the
historical legacy of institutions in shaping taxpayer behavior. My analysis of the structures
of evasion in Italy demonstrated that the reasons for evasion cannot be limited to a small
number of quantitative variables, but instead, taxpayer behavior has to be analyzed as the
result of a myriad of simultaneous and interacting variables.
Chapter two reconsidered the theoretical frameworks and debates often induced to
frame an understanding of tax morale. Until the 1990s, tax compliance literature was more
concerned with why people evade taxes, rather than voluntarily pay. The most significant
debate was between those who believed that tax evasion was simply a result of rational
choice and those who believed that cultural and societal variables also constituted behav-
ior. The discourse has increasingly shifted to focus more on the latter; however, focusing
on culture and individual agency has came at the expense of institutional explanations.
The review demonstrated a deep division between the two schools of thought, presenting a
significant challenge to tax research.
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Chapter three explored the culturalist argument exploiting survey data provided by the
Bank of Italy and experimental data provided by Steinmo et al. (2015) and funded by Eu-
ropean Research Council. I formed three main hypotheses regarding regional differences
in civic culture, social capital, and tax morale. As had been firmly established in the lit-
erature elsewhere, individuals from North demonstrate higher tax morale than the citizens
from the South, although the discussion of why this may be the case has received little
attention. Differences in economic performance and government efficiency have been duly
documented, but the tax morale literature merely mentions it in passing; it is often just
taken at face-value. My results from the survey indicated that there is a difference in social
capital and civic culture between the North and the South, and they significantly increase
tax morale.
To validate these results, I conducted a series of tax compliance experiments, followed
by a Social Value Orientation (SVO) task that tests others-regarding preferences. Others-
regarding preferences are used instead of civic participation and social capital because it
gauges the extent to which an individual is individualistic or altruistic. As many observers
have noted, Southerns are more individualistic and their sense of civic duty only relates to
their immediate family, whereas citizens from the North are more prosocial and connected
to those outside their immediate family. SVO is tool of extracting bridging vs. bonding
social capital. The benefit of a laboratory setting is that we can control the environment
allowing us to more easily parse out cultural effects. The main critique of laboratory exper-
iments concerns the extensive use of students; however, Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992)
argue
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experimental results can contribute significantly to policy debates, as long as
some conditions are met: the payoffs, and the experimental setting must cap-
ture the essential properties of the naturally occurring setting that is the object
of investigations.
They further state, “there is also no reason to believe that cognitive processes of students
are different from those of ‘real’ people.” Contrary to our preconceived notions about
the South, SVO in the North was not different than the South, and tax compliance was
nearly the same. I, therefore, concluded that although tax compliance and tax morale differ
between the North and the South, when placed in a similar environment, participants from
the North and the South behave nearly identically. This then led me to ask the question:
Which institutions, then, have led to such disparate taxpayer behavior?
Chapter four historically examined the two most powerful institutions in Italy – the state
and the Catholic church. My analysis began with the Risorgimento and the state supporters
in the North vs. the anti-state Catholics, located mainly within the Vatican and Southern
Italy. In the end, unification pitted the North against the church and the South. Unification
resulted in a large decrease in economic performance in the South, furthering the deep-
seated resentments held against the North, and in that, the state. I suggested that Southern
Italians would opt to finance their local priest, instead of the state. However, the clergy’s
participation in World War I improved the early stigmatization of belonging to the Catholic
church held in the North. As church-state relations improved in the North, the situation in
the South continued to deteriorate. With the rise of Mussolini and Fascism (a center-north
movement) the divisions between North and South only increased requiring Southerners to
become increasingly dependent on patron-client relationships. Moreover, I argue that post-
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World War II created a situation that fostered political competition and progressive politics
in the North, but the DC’s monopoly exaggerated clietelistic politics in the South. This had
the effect of shaping functioning public institutions (albeit through clientelism) and a re-
sponsible citizenry in the North, and rather, a new form of clientelism that provided public
employment to unqualified workers and tax favors to local businessmen in the South. In the
1970s a series of tax reforms and strict penalization of tax evaders did little to combat the
deep rooted issues in the Italian tax system. This was followed by a series of major corrup-
tion scandals originating in the North in the 1980s and 1990s. The findings of this chapter
point to the complicated relationship between institutions and individual agency. There is
little doubt of a causal relationship between the aforementioned institutions and taxpayer
behavior, but this does not excuse individual action from evasive (dishonest) behavior.
This dissertation considered the broad question: “What shapes regional disparities in
Italian tax morale?” Simply put, the answer lies in both culture and institutions. Of course,
culture varies between Northern and Southern Italy, just as culture differers between North-
ern and Southern Europe, more generally; however, I demonstrated that the context in
which a culture is formed is more important when analyzing taxpayer behavior, then cul-
ture alone. Culture by it self cannot account for differences in evasion between Calabria
and Lombardy, or even, Italy and Sweden. Testing the Bank of Italy survey against my tax
compliance experiments exemplifies the contextual relationship between taxpayer behavior
and culture.
Increasingly, policy makers have relied upon carrot and stick approaches to fight tax
evasion, rather than fixing the underlying problem: unresponsive institutions. Augmenting
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penalties and fines, while at the same time promoting responsible taxpayers will increase
compliance to an extent, but insignificantly; Italy is a perfect example of this. Since Mus-
solini, Italy has increased fines and verification, but tax evasion has remained consistently
high, especially in the South. As shown in Figure 4.1 Figure 4.2, the quality of government
in Italy and Southern Italy, to a greater extent, is one of the lowest in Europe, supporting
the narrative that quality of institutions is an important component of taxpayer behavior.
Through the process of writing this dissertation, I have become increasingly convinced
that countries (regions in this case) with a large percentage of self-employed individuals
will inevitably have higher rates of evasion. Looking at Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4, we can see
that at least 35% of the workforce is self-employed in the South. Table 5.1 demonstrates
that only Greece has more self-employed individuals than Italy, just as only Greece has
more evasion.
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Table 5.1: Percentage of Self-Employed in Total Employment: 16 Western European Coun-
tries
Year 3-year
Country 2000 2010 2011 2012 Average
Norway 7.4 7.7 7.0 6.9 7.2
Denmark 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1
France 9.3 9.3 9.5 - 9.4
Sweden 10.3 11.0 10.4 10.5 10.6
Switzerland 13.2 10.6 10.7 10.7 10.6
Germany 11.0 11.6 11.7 11.6 11.7
Finland 13.7 13.5 13.4 13.6 13.5
Austria 13.1 13.8 13.8 13.3 13.6
United Kingdom 12.8 13.9 14.0 14.6 14.1
Belgium 15.8 14.4 14.3 14.3 14.3
Netherlands 11.2 15.0 15.0 15.3 15.1
Ireland 18.8 17.1 16.6 16.7 16.8
Spain 20.2 16.9 16.6 17.6 17.0
Portugal 26.0 22.9 21.3 21.9 22.0
Italy 28.5 25.5 25.2 25.1 25.3
Greece 42.0 35.5 36.3 36.8 36.2
Source: OECD Factbook 2014
The ability to deal exclusively in cash drastically increases the temptation to evade and
deceases the probability of being caught evading. Further research will more thoroughly
address the structural aspects of the economy on tax evasion and also the normative effect
this has on compliance. For example, is evasion more acceptable, and even contagious, in
societies that have a large number of self-employed and small businesses? Paradoxically,
enforcement and punishment could have adverse effects on the self-employed and small
businesses, which in turn, could be problematic for an economy that is dependent on self-
employed individuals.
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5.1 What’s next?
There is an old Neoplitan tradition known as caffè sopseso (suspended coffee). The
customer instead of purchasing one coffee pays for two. One for herself and another sus-
pended coffee for an unknown patron who cannot afford one. The suspended coffee has
become an entire movement representing a sense of duty to others. Although Neapolitans
are generous with coffee, their taxpaying behavior would suggest something entirely differ-
ent about their culture. Edward Banfield and Robert Putnam, have both written influential
books suggesting that Southern Italian citizens’ are inherently less civic than Northern Ital-
ians, which in turn, has led to less efficient government. This dissertation, has suggested
that it is not that the North intrinsically has more civic consciousness than the South, rather
Southerners are less willing to pay taxes because of the institutional arrangement that they
have been dealt.
One of the more contentious aspects of Making Democracy Work was its pessimism.
Culture’s path dependent nature translates into very few policy formulas. Unfortunately, I
am also left more pessimistic about the chances of reform than optimistic. Tax compliance
requires good governance both for enforcement and for citizens’ perception of the state.
Governments can implement large scale public awareness campaigns and make whistle-
blowing easier, for example. However, these policies are typically superficial, campaign
tools and have little meaningful effects on the extent of evasion. Until governments can
build transparent, efficient institutions, focused tax compliance policy is superfluous.
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Tax evasion is a global endemic of which Italy falls behind only Greece in the level of
tax evasion as a percentage of GDP per capita. But this is not a problem that is unique to
Italy and Greece alone; in fact, the Southern European countries, all of which have been
impacted by debt crises, have relatively high levels of evasion. They also share similar insti-
tutional characteristics such as fragmented welfare states, a large number of self-employed
individuals, and a history of clientelism. Exploiting Italy as a case study allows me to bet-
ter understand how taxpayer behavior is shaped in countries with similar characteristics.
As these states continue to decrease the size of their welfare states through mandatory cut-
backs and austerity, now more than ever, Southern European nations need to address the
underlying problems of poor governmental accountability and the bankrupt state of their
institutions. This should be the first meaningful step in fostering tax compliance.
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Appendices
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A. Appendix
A.1 Construction of Dependent Variable
Bank of Italy Survey of Household Wealth and Income
DV: Tax Morale: Index of questions regarding citizens’ opinions concerning public
spirit and taxation. The gauge citizen attitudes about the Italian tax system. They were
requested to identify the extent to which they agree to the following statements:
1. Here is a set of statements that some interviewees before you made about Italy’s tax
system. To what extent do you agree with each of them: not at all, very little, so-so,
quite a lot, very much?
(a) The more someone earns, the more (in percentage) he/she should contribute to
Government spending
(b) Paying taxes is one of the basic duties of citizenship
(c) Not paying taxes is one of the worst crimes a person can commit because it
harms the whole community
(d) Even if someone thinks a tax is unfair, he/she should pay it first and then com-
plain if necessary
(e) It is right to pay tax because it helps the weak
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(f) If everyone paid taxes, in the end we would all pay a little less
1= not at all; 2= very little; 3= so-so; 4 = quite a lot; 5 = very much.
2. Generally speaking, among the problems facing the Government, that of tax evasion
is:
(a) Very serious
(b) Serious
(c) The same as any other
(d) Marginal
(e) Non-existent
Before creating the index I will reverse the direction of this variable so that it
moves in the same direction as tax morale (i.e., very serious represents high tax
morale).
A.2 Construction of Independent Variables
Political Culture and Social Capital
1. Interest in politics: Coded from 1 to 4
(a) 1 being not at all,
(b) being not very,
(c) being fairly interested,
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(d) being very interested.
2. Number of associations: Based on the question: “In the last year, have you taken
an active part in gatherings of any of the following groups or associations: asso-
ciations/groups involved in social, environmental, union policy, religious, cultural,
sports or recreational, professional, or voluntary activities?”
(a) (no),
(b) (yes, with only one group/association)
(c) (yes, with more than one group/association)
3. Government responsibility to provide public services: Based on the question: Con-
sidering the Government’s need to guarantee public services, please say which state-
ment is closest to your own opinion:
(a) The Governments duty is to provide all citizens with as many public services
as possible (e.g. school, healthcare, pensions, transport, etc.) even if it means
heavy taxes;
(b) The Government has some unavoidable expenses for social welfare, which
should be covered by taxes and duties, increasing these as and when necessary;
(c) Taxation is too high, so if there is not enough money, expenses should be re-
duced by cutting back services; and
(d) The Government should raise the bare minimum in taxes and duties to cover
absolutely essential public services (e.g. defense, justice, the police, etc.) and
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leave the rest to private initiative. The coding has also been reversed to better
reflect the direction of tax morale.
4. Perception of Evasion: Based on the question: What percentage of the total amount
of tax due from the population does the Government lose as a result of tax evasion?
(a) Less than 10%;
(b) Between 10% and 20%;
(c) Between 20% and 30%;
(d) Between 30% and 50%;
(e) More than 50%.
5. Amnesty is an index of the following two questions: What is your opinion of the
practice of granting amnesties?
(a) Amnesties are a good system and should be granted as often as possible to
recover some of the lost revenue;
(b) Amnesties are a good system, but should be used sparingly so as not to encour-
age tax evaders;
(c) Amnesties are an unfair but necessary method of balancing the national ac-
counts; and
(d) Amnesties are a very unfair system because they discourage honest citizens.
6. What do you think is the main outcome of a tax amnesty?
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(a) Tax evasion diminishes because previously undeclared income is uncovered;
(b) Tax evasion increases because the amnesty rewards tax evaders and discourages
honest taxpayers;
(c) Tax evasion doesn’t change because once tax evaders have regularized their past
position, they begin to evade tax again until the next amnesty.
7. Tax inspection: Based on the question: Do you think it would be a good thing if tax
inspections were made more often, or not?
(a) Yes, I would like them to be done much more often because it’s the only way to
stop tax evasion;
(b) Yes, I would like them to be done more often, but within limits, to stop the
Government interfering too much in people’s lives;
(c) I think things are all right as they are;
(d) No, I wish they were done less often because the present level of control is
already too great;
(e) No, absolutely not; I think they should be done less often.
8. Honesty
(a) Not paying for public transportation:
(b) Keeping money found by accident: Measure citizens honesty and are based on
a series of scenarios in which the respondents are asked to judge the extent of
121
which the activity is justified on a scale from 1-10 (1 = never justifiable; 10 =
always justifiable). I will reverse the coding so it better reflects tax morale.
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